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THE PRESUMPTION OF GUILT:
SYSTEMIC FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN CALIFORNIA
LAURENCE

A. BENNER*

I. INTRODUCTION

Our adversary system of criminal justice is premised upon the
belief that effective advocacy by counsel for both the prosecution and
the defense, conducted within a process founded upon principles of
fundamental fairness, will "best promote the ultimate objective that
the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free." 1 The exoneration of
the wrongfully convicted by the California Innocence Project and
other innocence projects across the county has revealed, however, that
our criminal justice system is sometimes deeply flawed.2 In theory,
every person accused of a serious crime comes to court protected by a
presumption of innocence and the promise of effective representation
*

Professor of Law, California Western School of Law.

1. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975). Herring invalidated a state
law that precluded defense counsel from making a closing argument in a bench trial
because it deprived defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of
counsel. Id. at 865.
2. Since 1989 there have been over 230 exonerations of innocent defendants by
innocence projects based upon DNA evidence. Know the Cases, The Innocence
Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2009). Since
1973, the convictions of 130 innocent defendants awaiting execution on death row
have been overturned. The Innocence List, Death Penalty Information Center,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row (last visited
Mar. 11, 2009). There have been wrongful convictions of the innocent in twenty-six
of the thirty-six states which have the death penalty. Facts About the Death Penalty,
Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf
(last visited Mar. 11, 2009). See also Jeffrey Chinn & Ashley Ratliff, "I was Put Out
the Door with Nothing "-Addressing the Needs of the Exonerated Under a Refugee
Model, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 405 (2009) (describing exonerations by the California
Innocence Project).

266

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

by a well-prepared and experienced defense counsel, supported by
defense investigators, experts, and other resources needed to mount an
effective defense. 3 Yet recent empirical research undertaken by the
author for the California Commission on the Fair Administration of
Justice (Fair Commission) portrays a discouraging reality that is often
far different from this theoretical model.4

3. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453-54 (1895) (presumption of
innocence); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (right to counsel in
felony cases); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (felony defendants
entitled to the effective assistance of counsel); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82
(1985) (defendant in capital case entitled to funds to hire expert psychiatrist to assist
in raising insanity defense).
4. This article is based upon data collected pursuant to a grant from the
California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice in connection with a
study by the Commission concerning the problem of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The Fair Commission was established by the California State Senate to
'study and review the administration of criminal justice in California, to determine
the extent to which that process has failed in the past' and to examine safeguards
and improvements." Press Release, Cal. Comm'n on the Fair Admin. of Justice,
Publ'n of Final Report and Recommendations (Aug. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/press/Press29.pdf. The author, assisted by research
assistants Lorenda Stem, Alex Avakian, Mathew Izu, and students in the author's
Advanced Criminal Justice Seminar, prepared two reports for the Commission based
upon examination of over 2,500 ineffective assistance of counsel decisions,
questionnaires to judges, public defenders and certified criminal defense specialists,
as well as court statistics and financial data obtained from each of California's fiftyeight counties. See infra Part II, Methodology. The first report, Systemic Factors
Affecting the Quality of CriminalDefense Representation,PreliminaryReport, and a
second Supplemental Report were presented at the July and October 2007 meetings
of the Commission. LAURENCE A. BENNER ET AL., SYSTEMIC FACTORS AFFECTING
THE QUALITY OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION (July 2007) [hereinafter
SYSTEMIC FACTORS I], available at http://cdm15024.contentdm.oclc.org/cgibin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p178601ccp2&CISOPTR=1240&filename=1241.pd
f; LAURENCE A. BENNER ET AL., SYSTEMIC FACTORS AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF
CRIMINAL

DEFENSE

REPRESENTATION,

SUPPLEMENTAL

REPORT

(Oct.

2007)

[hereinafter SYSTEMIC FACTORS II], available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/

reports/prosecutorial/expert/Supplemental%20Report%20Benner.pdf. All data not
otherwise referenced to one of the above-mentioned two reports is from the database
assembled and kept on file with the author. The opinions, conclusions, and
recommendations of the author do not necessarily represent the opinions,
conclusions, or recommendations of the California Commission on the Fair
Administration of Justice.
The author wishes to thank the judges, public defenders, contract defenders,
and certified criminal defense specialists who participated in answering our
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California, having established the first public defender office in
1914, has always been looked upon as a leader in providing indigent
defense services. 5 Sadly, in some of the richest as well as poorest
counties in California, we find a system that has broken faith with a
fundamental principle that underlies our adversary system: the
presumption of innocence. Instead, the criminal justice systems in
these counties have forgotten their primary mission and increasingly
operate under a presumption of guilt. That perception, coupled with
the escalating cost of providing counsel for the indigent accused, has
resulted in a system where processing the "presumed guilty" as
cheaply as possible has been made a higher priority than investigating
the possibility of innocence. This is not to suggest that all or even a
majority of the public defender offices in California are providing
inadequate representation. What we do find, however, is a tremendous
disparity across the state in the ability of individual counties to
provide an adequate defense for a person who cannot afford to hire
their own attorney. We also find systemic factors embedded in
questionnaires and to express special thanks to Lorenda Stem for her extraordinary
organizational skills and budgetary analysis; Alex Avakian for his thorough
attention to detail in data collection and processing; Mathew Izu for exceptional
research assistance; and Miranda Benner for her generous assistance in graphic
design. The organization, analysis, and presentation of the massive amount of data
collected would not have been possible without their unique contributions. In
addition, the author is indebted to Kitty A. Baker, Lance D. Banks, Drew A.
Callahan, Solomon Chang, Wayland C. Chang, Jessica L. Coto, AnnaMarie F.
Farrales, Andrea Gable, Kristina M. Hein, Victor J. Herrera, Joanna A. Hojdus,
Taren Kern, Pritesh Kothary, Kristen B. Longo, Lindsey E. McGregor, Colleen
Polak, Amber B. Rabon, Shelly D. Rowe-Krusic, Meghan L. Salmans, and Martin
Serra for their assistance in legal research and collection of empirical data from each
of the fifty-eight counties in California.
5. The Los Angeles County Public Defender Office was the first public
defender office established in the nation in 1914. Los Angeles County Public
Defender, History of the Office, http://pd.co.la.ca.us/History.html (last visited Mar.
3, 2009). See also Nancy Goldberg, Los Angeles County Public Defender Office in
Perspective, 45 CAL. W. L. REv. 445 (2009), for an excellent discussion of the
current operation of the Los Angeles County Public Defender Office. The concept of
the public defender was first introduced by Clara Shortridge Foltz, California's first
female lawyer, in a speech at the World's Fair in 1893. Clara Foltz, Address to the
Congress on Jurisprudence and Law Reform: Public Defenders-Rights of Persons
Accused of Crime-Abuses Now Existing, in 48 ALB. L.J. 248 (1893). See generally
Barbara Babcock, Inventing the Public Defender, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1267
(2006).
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California law and procedure, which threaten to erode the ability of all
indigent defense systems to fulfill their constitutional mandate to
make the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel
a meaningful reality.
More than eight out of every ten felony defendants prosecuted in
the superior courts of California are indigent and must be provided
with counsel by the county. 6 As discussed below, our research has
revealed that there are significant disparities between counties in their
commitment and ability to provide effective defense services for the
indigent accused. Even more disturbing, this research also documents
that while public defenders represent the lion's share of criminal
defendants in California, in almost all counties across the state there is
a glaring disparity between the resources allocated to the prosecution
and the defense function. For every dollar spent statewide on
prosecution, only fifty-three cents is spent on average for the defense
of the indigent accused. Yet at least 85% (and in some counties as
high as 95%) of the felony docket is comprised of defendants who
must rely upon publicly provided defense services.7 Not surprisingly,
when measured against national standards promulgated to ensure the
delivery of adequate defense services, we found that the majority of
these indigent defense systems are laboring under excessive caseloads.
Over half of the public defender offices surveyed reported their staff
attorneys handled caseloads that exceeded national standards
established by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals 8 and the American Bar Association. 9 This was
6. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
7. Id.

8. See

NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND

GOALS, COURTS 276 (1973) [hereinafter NAC]. Standard 13.12 specifies maximum
caseload standards per year for felonies (150), misdemeanors (400), juvenile (200),
mental health (200), and appeals (25). Id.
9. See ABA STANDING COMM'N ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM (2002) [hereinafter ABA,
TEN PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.abanet.orglegalservices/downloads/
sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet.pdf. These standards, approved by the
American Bar Association House of Delegates in February 2002, were created to
assist governmental officials and "constitute the fundamental criteria necessary to
design a system that provides effective, efficient, high quality, ethical, conflict-free
legal representation for criminal defendants who are unable to afford an attorney."
Id. Introduction. The commentary to the Fifth Principle (requiring defense counsel's
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confirmed by private practitioners, certified as criminal defense
specialists, who were asked to assess the health of the public defender
system in their county. One in four of these independent observers
reported that excessive public defender workloads were a serious
problem in their county.
The problem of excessive attorney caseloads is aggravated further
by the lack of adequate support services. Both institutional and
contract defenders 0 reported having excessive investigator caseloads.
Some institutional defender offices have only one investigator for
every nine attorneys and several contract defenders have no staff
investigators at all. A majority of the certified criminal defense
specialists also reported that the lack of investigative resources was a
significant problem for their indigent defense system. In our
examination of appellate cases, we discovered that the failure to
conduct an adequate investigation was a major cause of ineffective
representation.
An example of how the lack of adequate resources for
investigation can impact the ability to mount an effective defense can
be seen in a case from one of our major metropolitan counties. 1 The
public defender, who had twelve years experience, was found
ineffective for failing to interview two eyewitnesses to an alleged
carjacking.1 2 These witnesses contradicted the prosecution's sole
witness on the critical fact that the defendant possessed a weapon. It
appeared that the public defender did send an investigator out to
interview one witness, without success, and did attempt
unsuccessfully to contact the other witness by phone.1 3 Although
blame was laid on the head of the attorney, a substantial contributing
cause of this failure to investigate may well have been the fact that the
investigator's workload precluded a more thorough and persistent
search for these witnesses, one of whom apparently did not want to be
workload to be controlled to permit the rendering of quality representation)
specifically refers to National Advisory Commission Standard 13.12 and states:
"National caseload standards should in no event be exceeded." Id. at 2.
10. See infra Part II, Methodology, for definitions of institutional and contract
defender systems.
11. Black v. Larson, No. 01-56813, 2002 WL 1941165 (9th Cir. Aug. 22,
2002).
12. Id. at **1-2.
13. Id.
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found. One hundred percent (100%) of the institutional defender
offices responding to our survey indicated that excessive investigator
workloads were a problem. By continuing to tolerate both excessive
attorney and investigator workloads, we substantially impair the
ability to provide effective representation and increase the risk of
wrongfully convicting the innocent accused.
Unfortunately, when examples of injustice come to light there is a
tendency to blame the failures of our system upon the individual
lawyers involved. This is not surprising, as our appellate procedure is
ordinarily not structured to litigate claims of actual innocence, but
instead examines whether the defendant had a fair trial. 14 If it is later
discovered that evidence pointing to innocence was available, we
14. Defense counsel has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation,
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), but this does not ensure that
evidence of defendant's innocence will be found. Whether a defendant can bring a
free standing claim of actual innocence has been a matter of debate ever since
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). Herrera was a narcotics trafficker
sentenced to death for the murder of several state troopers. Id. at 393. After his
conviction, Herrera's brother died and the brother's lawyer came to court claiming
that the brother was guilty of the crime, not Herrera. Id. at 396. Although the
Supreme Court affirmed Herrera's conviction and sentence, five justices indicated in
different opinions that a truly compelling claim of innocence would be cognizable
via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In order to establish this "free standing" or
bare claim of innocence, Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter stated that the
petitioner must not only show there is a reasonable doubt as to guilt, but that "he is
probably actually innocent." Id. at 435. Justice O'Connor also cautioned that the test
should not be too low, lest the Court become inundated with "frivolous claims of
actual innocence." Id. at 426. Because the Court did not decide in Herrera's favor, a
debate has ensued as to whether, in the absence of constitutional error, such a "free
standing" claim of innocence can in fact be presented in a habeas petition, and if so,
what the standard of persuasiveness as to innocence should be.
The Court again declined to resolve the Herreradebate and rule one way or
the other regarding the legitimacy of a free standing innocence claim in House v.
Bell, stating: "whatever burden a hypothetical freestanding innocence claim would
require, this petitioner has not satisfied it." House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006).
Acknowledging that the defendant in House had cast "considerable doubt on his
guilt," Justice Kennedy nevertheless observed that this was not a case of "conclusive
exoneration" and hinted that "more convincing proof of innocence" would be
required to support a Herreraclaim. Id. at 553-55. While there was circumstantial
evidence against House, and a witness saw him near the location where the victim's
body was discovered, the victim's husband later made admissions that he had
accidentally killed his wife. There was also substantial evidence that the police had
deliberately fabricated forensic evidence at House's trial.
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assume counsel is obviously to blame for not uncovering it at the time
of trial. Narrowly focusing upon the errors of individual attorneys,
however, ignores the wider systemic conditions that can give rise to
such errors. As shown below, this includes not only excessive attorney
and investigator caseloads, but also the lack of prompt appointment,
the loss of the check and balance once provided by the traditional
preliminary hearing, the lack of independent forensic resources for the
defense, and the absence of any effective remedy for the prosecutor's
failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused or to provide in a
timely manner through discovery, the evidence against the accused
that the defense will be required to challenge.
The institutional public defender office is, in theory, an effective
delivery mechanism for providing quality representation in a cost
effective manner. Its capacity to develop and maintain skilled
expertise, furnish comprehensive training and supervision, and
provide the supportive environment necessary for effective
representation is without equal. But until we address the systemic
problems that hinder effective representation and reduce the
tremendous disparity between the resources allocated to the
prosecution and the defense, we destroy the promise of our criminal
justice system to truly administer equal justice.
Part II of this article describes the methodology used to collect the
data reported in this article, and Part III gives an overview of some of
the most significant findings arising from the research conducted for
the Fair Commission. Parts IV through VI report details of our survey
of California's institutional public defender, contract defender, and
assigned counsel systems. Part VII examines the funding for indigent
defense services, revealing the disparity between counties and the
disparity in resources between prosecution and defense. Part VIII
discusses California judicial decisions that found ineffective
assistance of counsel and looks at the types of errors that are most
frequently made. These cases are individually detailed in Appendix II.
Part IX presents a number of solutions to help alleviate some of the
systemic problems that contribute to the ineffective assistance of
counsel in California. Part X concludes by listening to the voices of
those public defenders and private criminal defense attorneys who
responded with comments about the system they live, breathe, and
work in on a daily basis.
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II. METHODOLOGY
We began our study in January of 2007. We first determined
whether an institutional public defender, contract defender, or
assigned counsel system was the primary provider of indigent defense
services in each of the fifty-eight counties in California. 15 We have
defined "institutional public defender office" as a county department
where the attorneys employed are salaried public employees.
Institutional public defenders are distinguished from contract
defenders who are also often called public defenders. We have defined
"contract defender" as a solo practitioner or a law firm that acts as an
independent contractor when negotiating with the county to handle
indigent criminal cases.
A third method of providing counsel is the "assigned counsel
system" where counsel for an individual case is appointed from a
panel of private attorneys who have individual private practices. All
three types of providers can operate in a single county. For example, a
county can have an institutional public defender office that provides
representation for the majority of defendants, but use a contract
defender or assigned counsel system to represent defendants where the
regular public defender has a conflict of interest. Figure 1 shows the
6
primary provider for each county.'

15. We are grateful to the California Public Defender's Association for
providing the names and addresses of their member offices. Online searches of
County web pages and telephone calls to court personnel gained additional
information to complete the list of indigent defense providers whom we surveyed.

The responses by these actors to our questionnaires confirmed whether they were the
primary provider of indigent defense services or handled only cases where the
primary provider had a conflict of interest.
16. Figure 1 is based on data verified as of July 2007.
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Data was collected from each county concerning felony and
misdemeanor filings, and comparative budget information was
obtained regarding the amount spent on indigent defense and
prosecution. Statistical data on case filings was obtained from the
Judicial Council of California. 17 We obtained budgets for indigent
defense and prosecution
from fifty-one (88%) of the fifty-eight
18
counties in California.
In addition to collecting statistical data, we sent questionnaires to
Superior Court judges, indigent defense providers, and private
practitioners specializing in criminal defense across the state. As
Figure 2 indicates, forty-four (76%) of California's fifty-eight
counties were represented in the responses we received back.
Appendix I lists the counties from which a response was received.

17.

2007 COURT STATISTICS REPORT: STATEWIDE
(2007) (covering fiscal years 1995-1996 through 2005-2006), available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/csr2006.pdf. The Judicial Council, an arm of the Administrative Office of the Courts, collects this data directly from
the counties.
18. Seven counties (Del Norte, Inyo, Madera, Mariposa, Modoc, Tehama, and
Tuolumne) did not have budgets available online and repeated efforts to obtain a
manual copy of the budget were unavailing. Prosecution and indigent defense
budget information was retrieved from a county's adopted budget for the most
recent year (2006-07). If the adopted budget was unavailable for the most recent
year, the county's recommended budget was used. In the event that both the adopted
and recommended budget for the most recent year was missing, the county's actual
budget from the preceding year was used (usually 2005-06). Forty budgets were
from the 2006-07 recording year, eight budgets (16%) were from 2005-06, and three
budgets (6 %) were from the 2004-05 recording year.
TRENDS

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL.,
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Figure 2
We designed and, with the help of members of the San Diego
Public Defender Office and San Diego Criminal Defense Lawyer's
Club, field-tested a questionnaire for providers of indigent criminal
defense services. This questionnaire covered twenty-five topics and
collected forty-five items of information. Some of the questions asked
for factual information (e.g., how many staff attorneys, investigators,
etc. are employed by the office?). Other questions asked the
respondent to make an evaluative judgment. For example, chief
defenders were asked: To what extent does your office confront any of
the following problems? Respondents were then asked to rank the
significance of the problem (e.g., excessive attorney workloads) on a
zero to five point scale that indicated: 0 = not a problem, 1 = minor
problem, 3 = significant problem, 5 = serious problem. Respondents
were also given the opportunity to comment with open-ended
responses and address concerns not listed on the questionnaire.
The questionnaire was limited to one page, front and back, to
encourage an adequate response rate and indigent defense providers
from over two-thirds (67%) of the counties responded. The response
rate for counties having an institutional public defender was 85%.
Only sixteen of the fifty-seven contract defenders responded. These
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responders, however, represented 45% of the twenty-four counties that
use a contract defender as the primary provider. The only county to
use an assigned counsel system as a primary provider also responded.
We also designed separate questionnaires for certified criminal
defense specialists 19 and judges. 20 Thirty-eight Superior Court judges
answered our questionnaires. Almost a third of the criminal defense
specialists responded (n=110), representing twenty-one counties that
were largely in metropolitan and urban areas. Some counties have no
certified criminal defense specialist.
As Appendix I reflects, counties were broken down into nine
population categories. Nine counties having a population exceeding
one million were classified as metropolitan. Twenty-two counties with
populations under 100,000 were classified as rural, and twenty-seven
counties having populations from 100,000 to 1,000,000 were
classified as urban. We achieved a response from either an indigent
defense provider or a certified criminal defense specialist for all
(100%) of the metropolitan counties. The response rate was 93% for
urban counties and 36% for rural counties.
An analysis of ineffective assistance of counsel cases from the last
ten years was also conducted. Using a variety of research tools, we
reviewed over 2,500 published and unpublished appellate court
decisions in which the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was
19. The standards for certification by the State Bar of California as a criminal
defense specialist require within the five years immediately preceding application,
that counsel have: 1) five felony jury trials, 2) five additional jury trials regardless of
the nature of the offense, 3) forty additional criminal matters, and 4) any two of the
following: a) five hearings on a motion to suppress evidence, and three
extraordinary writ proceedings, or b) three appeals, or c) five additional jury trials.
STATE BAR OF CAL.,

STANDARDS

FOR CERTIFICATION AND RECERTIFICATION IN

1 (2008), availableat http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/rules/Rules_T
itle3_Div2-Ch4_LegSpecCrim.pdf. In addition, the applicant must have references
from practicing criminal defense lawyers, judges, and opposing counsel, and must,
within the last three years, have completed forty-five hours of training in criminal
law and procedure, evidence, and trial advocacy. To maintain certification, counsel
must demonstrate every five years that he or she has continued to try cases to a jury
and has at least sixty hours of specifically approved training for criminal law
specialists. Id.
20. These judges were either the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court or a
judge who was specifically identified as having administrative responsibility over
criminal cases in their county. To encourage candid responses, judges were not
asked to name the counties in which they presided.
CRIMINAL LAW
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raised. 2 Appendix II contains detailed information with respect to
each case in which counsel's performance was found to be deficient.
III. OVERVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS
The most important finding from our study is the discovery that
indigent defense providers in many California counties lack the
resources necessary to conduct adequate defense investigations. As
discussed below, the duty of defense counsel to conduct a thorough
factual investigation is an essential component of the right to the
effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Constitution. This
finding is especially troubling because it concerns more than the
technical right to a fair trial; it goes directly to the heart of guilt or
innocence.
As Figure 3 discloses, our study of ineffective assistance of
counsel decisions reveals that in nearly half (44%) of the cases finding
deficient performance, the error involved the failure to conduct a
proper investigation.

21. Initial searches were run on January 19, 2007 using Westlaw's CA-CS-All
database [CO(CA) & 110K641.13 or 110K641.11 or llOXXX & Strickland &
da(last 10 years)]. This retrieved over 900 appellate cases, decided within the last
ten years, which were culled to find cases actually raising the ineffectiveness issue.
A second run using LexisNexis was also performed which gathered additional cases.
We discovered, however, that there were still many more unpublished decisions
which do not have Westlaw headnotes. We located these additional cases through a
series of word search formulas. While our initial Westlaw search pulled appellate
cases decided within the past ten years, we found that the trials in a number of these
cases had occurred decades ago. We therefore expanded our exploration of 2007
cases and limited our follow-up research seeking unpublished cases to appellate
decisions rendered within the last five years. The last case examined was decided on
June 27, 2007.
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Data from indigent defense providers, certified criminal defense
specialists, and judges confirmed the lack of investigative resources
throughout the state. Over two thirds (69%) of the judges answering
our questionnaire on this subject admitted that the lack of resources to

investigate cases thoroughly was a problem for the indigent defense
system in their county. Eighty-nine percent (89%) of the responding
certified criminal defense specialists also reported that the indigent
defense system in their county faced problems because of the lack of
resources to investigate cases thoroughly.
One hundred percent (100%) of the institutional public defender
offices and all but one of the contract defenders reported that
excessive investigator workloads were a problem. In six counties the
defender had no staff investigators at all.22 One contract defender, a
solo practitioner in a rural county, complained he had difficulty
investigating cases because the court would not appoint an
investigator unless it was a serious case. Not surprisingly, while 59%
of the certified specialists indicated that an investigator often, very
22. Two were institutional public defender offices and four were contract
defenders.
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often, or always interviewed victims and eyewitnesses before a
preliminary examination, only a little more than one third (35%) of the
indigent defense providers reported routinely conducting such
interviews at this stage.
As Figure 4 reflects, the ratio of attorneys to investigators also
varied widely between counties. While a number of offices had one
investigator for every three or four attorneys, other offices had ratios
as high as nine attorneys to one staff investigator.

Figure 4
The problems created by the lack of investigatory resources are
further exacerbated by the fact that a number of prosecutors across the
state appear to be routinely failing to comply with their discovery
obligations under both state law and the Constitution. The
overwhelming majority of both certified criminal defense specialists
(90%) and indigent defense providers (93%) reported they had
experienced a problem with prosecutors withholding evidence
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23
favorable to the accused, known as Brady material.
Over 90% of these respondents also reported that delay in turning
over routinely requested discovery material was a problem.
California's statutory discovery provisions set forth a laundry list of
specific information and material that the prosecution is required to
disclose to the defense.24 This includes the names and addresses of
witnesses the prosecution intends to call at trial, along with any
written or recorded statements of such witnesses, "relevant real
evidence seized or obtained as part of the investigation," and the
results of "any scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons which the
prosecutor intends to offer in evidence at the trial.",25 The defense has
similar reciprocal discovery obligations.26 However, the statutory
scheme does not provide that such mandatory disclosures
automatically be promptly made. Instead, the statute merely provides
27
that such disclosures are required "at least 30 days prior to the trial.",
The trial, of course, can be many months after arrest. In a death
penalty case the trial can be delayed even a year or longer.28
A separate provision establishes the exclusive mechanism for the
enforcement of discovery obligations. 29 This subsection requires that
before enforcement can be sought, defense counsel must first make an
informal request for the desired information or materials and then wait
fifteen days before seeking to compel production. 30 While judges are
given ample powers to impose sanctions for the failure to promptly

23. Prosecutors have a constitutional duty to turn over evidence favorable to
the accused, including evidence that could be used to impeach a prosecution witness.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667
(1985) (extending Brady to impeachment evidence). Prosecutors also have a legal
duty under state law to disclose to the defendant "any exculpatory evidence." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1054.1(e) (West 2009). Almost two thirds (65%) of the indigent
defense providers (institutional public defenders and contract defenders combined)
reported that withholding Brady evidence was a significant problem in their county.
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1 (West 2009).

25. Id.
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.3 (West 2009).
27. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.7 (West 2009).

28. Telephone Interview with Gary Gibson, veteran public defender with the
San Diego Public Defender Office (April 2009).
29. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.5 (West 2009).

30. Id.
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comply with discovery obligations, 3 1 a number of defenders and
certified specialists complained in the comments section of our
questionnaire that judges refused to impose sanctions on prosecutors
for discovery violations.
Figure 5 reflects the extent of the delayed discovery problem as
reported by institutional public defender offices. 32 Almost a third
(31%) reported that the lack of prompt disclosure of discovery by the
prosecution was a serious problem.

Figure 5
The failure to provide indigent defense counsel with adequate
resources to conduct an independent defense investigation, coupled
with the inability of counsel to promptly gain access to the
31. Id.
32. n=32. The five-point scale used to measure significance was defined in the
questionnaire as follows: O=not a problem, 1=minor problem, 3=significant
problem, 5=serious problem. Respondents marking a "2" were coded as "moderate
problem." Respondents marking a "4" were coded as "very significant problem."
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information and evidence the defense will be required to counter at
trial, combines to seriously undermine the ability to provide effective
representation. One of the most vital functions of defense counsel in
an adversary system is to test the prosecution's case. In order to do
that, defense counsel must be able to interview the witnesses against
the accused and investigate to determine the accuracy of their
statements. Yet ninety-nine percent (99%) of all indigent defense
providers reported having difficulty interviewing prosecution
witnesses. Over a quarter of the institutional defenders, moreover,
reported that this was a serious problem. Figure 6 reflects the extent of
the problem faced by institutional public defender offices in
interviewing prosecution witnesses.3 3

Inability to Interview Prosecution Witnesses
90%

40%
30%
20%
30%
50%

V

inrtProblem9

Extent of Problem

Figure 6
Ninety-five percent (95%) of the certified specialists also
reported that they had difficulty interviewing prosecution witnesses in

33.

n=32. See supra note 32.
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retained cases. More than one in four (29%) stated that this was a
serious problem.
It is often assumed that a defendant who is able to afford to hire an
attorney will also have the funds necessary to conduct a proper
investigation. However, we discovered that privately-retained counsel
also often lack sufficient funds to mount an effective challenge to the
prosecution's case. Eighty percent (80%) of the certified criminal
defense specialists reported they had difficulty obtaining DNA testing
in retained cases. Almost two thirds of the indigent defense providers
also indicated difficulty in obtaining DNA as well as other forensic
testing. Both retained counsel (92%) and indigent defense providers
(67%) reported that they were at a disadvantage compared to the
prosecution in hiring expert witnesses because they lacked sufficient
funds to match what the prosecution could pay for expert assistance.
Finally, it should be recognized that the true impact of the lack of
adequate resources cannot be fully appreciated without understanding
the pressurized environment in which defense counsel work on a daily
basis. Over 90% of the indigent defense providers and 94% of
certified criminal defense specialists reported that judicial pressure to
expedite cases was a problem to some degree. Judicial pressure was
not limited to just metropolitan counties, but existed in counties of all
population sizes.3 4 In almost one half (45%) of the counties judicial
pressure on defense counsel was viewed as a significant problem.
In light of these findings we have proposed solutions, discussed in
Part IX, which will help improve the ability of both privately retained
counsel and indigent defense providers to conduct an adequate
investigation. This includes proposals to (1) reinstate the traditional
preliminary hearing as it existed prior to Proposition 115 (which
dramatically curtailed its historic function); (2) to amend the criminal
discovery provisions to clarify the obligations of prosecutors to
disclose favorable evidence to the defense; (3) to make the
prosecutor's duty to promptly turn over discovery enforceable; and (4)
to create an independent forensics center for the exclusive use of the
defense.

34. Counties were grouped into nine population categories and then classified
as Metropolitan (over 1 million), Urban (one million to 100,000), and Rural (under
100,000). See Appendix I.
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IV. INSTITUTIONAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES

Just over one half (57%) of California's fifty-eight counties have
created an institutional public defender office as a county department
to serve as the primary provider of criminal defense services to the
indigent accused. Offices in twenty-nine (88%) of these thirty-three
counties responded to our questionnaire. 36 All of these offices
represented felony and misdemeanor clients and the majority (96%)
also provided representation in juvenile and mental commitment
cases. Over half (58%) of the offices handled additional matters such
as civil contempt, probate conservatorship, child support, and civil
commitment of sexually violent predators. The majority (96%) were
primary providers.
A. Excessive Workloads
1. Staff Attorneys
The concern that public defender offices would be overloaded
with too many cases to be able to provide effective representation has
led to the promulgation of a number of state and national standards.
The California State Bar has adopted standards that provide:
Indigent defense providers shall not accept nor be burdened with
excessive workloads that compromise the ability of the provider to
render competent and quality representation in a timely manner,
without the risk of damaging the mental/physical health and

35. See supra Part II, Methodology, for definition of "institutional public
defender."
36. There are sometimes several institutional public defender offices in a single
county because of the need to deal with conflicts of interest arising from the
representation of co-defendants. See infra note 84 for discussion of conflicting
interests. For example, in San Diego County, the Department of the Public Defender
is the primary provider (see http://www.sdcounty.ca.gov/public-defender/aboutus.
html). The Department of Alternative Public Defender (see http://www.sdcounty.
ca.gov/apd/) and the Office of Assigned Counsel (see http://www.sdcounty.ca.gov
/oac/) handle conflict of interest cases.
Forty-five questionnaires were sent out to institutional public defender
offices and thirty-two (71%) of these offices responded. One office also partially
responded to a telephone follow-up, making n=33 for some questions.
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motivation of the providers.

The American Bar Association (ABA) standards relating to the
defense function provide:
Defense counsel should not carry a workload that, by reason of its
excessive size, interferes with the rendering of quality
representation, endangers the client's interest in the speedy
disposition 38
of charges, or may lead to the breach of professional
obligations.
The ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System further
provides:
National caseload standards should in no event be exceeded, but the
concept of workload (i.e., caseload adjusted by factors such as case
nonrepresentational
complexity, support services, and an attorney's
39
duties) is a more accurate measurement.
The majority of California's counties using institutional public
defender offices do not comply with these standards. All institutional
public defender offices, except one, reported having a problem with
excessive attorney workloads. These respondents were asked to rank
the significance of this problem on a five-point scale. 40 Over 79% of
the institutional defenders stated that excessive attorney workloads
were a significant, very significant, or serious problem (see Figure 7
below).4 1

37.

THE STATE BAR OF CAL., GUIDELINES ON INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES
DELIVERY SYSTEMS 24 (2006) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA STATE BAR STANDARDS].
38. ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION 126, Standard 4-1.3(e) (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA,
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE], available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust
/standards/prosecutionfunction.pdf; see also ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 68-69, Standard 5-5.3 (3d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter ABA, STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES], available at

http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/providingdefense.pdf.
39. ABA, TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 2.
40. See supra note 32 for definitions and coding of responses.
41. n=33. One chief defender answered this question during a telephone
follow-up.
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Figure 7
This finding was independently confirmed by certified criminal
defense specialists who were also asked to assess the health of public
defender offices in the county in which they practice. Almost three
fourths (73%) of those responding from counties with institutional
public defender offices indicated that excessive attorney caseloads
were a significant problem. More than one in four (28%) criminal
defense specialists ranked it as a serious problem.
Fifty-nine percent (59%) of the institutional public defender
offices reported having felony caseloads that exceeded the standard of
150 non-capital felonies per year established by the National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (NAC) 42 and
adopted by the ABA in its Ten Principles.43 Seventy-five percent
(75%) of these public defender offices exceeded the NAC Standard of
400 non-traffic misdemeanors per attorney per year.
As the National Study Commission on Defense Services observed
in 1976, these national standards should serve only as a starting point
42. NAC, supra note 8, at 276.
43. See ABA, TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 9.
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in the analysis, because only an actual workload study can determine
the maximum number of cases an attorney can effectively handle in a
given jurisdiction.44 The National Center for State Courts, for
example, did a workload assessment for the Maryland Public
Defender Office in 2005, which recommended substantially lower
caseloads than the national standards.
Operating under excessive caseloads, of course, has a ripple
effect. It not only makes ineffective assistance more likely, it also
leads to burnout. Turnover of experienced staff was a problem in over
62% of the public defender offices. Almost three out of four offices
44. THE NAT'L STUDY COMM'N ON DEFENSE SERVICES, GUIDELINES FOR
LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, FINAL REPORT 295 (National
Legal Aid & Defender Association 1976) [hereinafter NATIONAL STUDY
COMMISSION].

45. BRIAN J. OSTROM, MATTHEW KLEIMAN, & CHRISTOPHER RYAN,
MARYLAND ATTORNEY AND STAFF WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT 1, 35 (National Center
for State Courts 2005), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/
ResWorkLd-MDAtty&StaffWkLdAs05Pub.pdf.
Maryland: Recommended Annual Attorney Caseloads Based on Final Case Weights
Cases per Attorney
Rural
Capital (Death Notice Not Filed) 3
Capital (Death Notice Filed)
1
Violent Felony
57
Non-Violent Felony
100
Homicide
12
Misdemeanor Jury Trial
Demands and Appeals
351

Suburban
3
1
52
79
2
463

Urban
3
1
50
118
15
320

The recommendations in the table were based upon a time study, focus group
discussions, and surveys of attorneys. Id. at 110.
The Maryland study highlights that there are differences in the workload
urban and rural offices can handle. Curiously, our study also found that there
appeared to be a relationship between California defenders' own views of how many
cases one attorney could effectively handle and the population of their county. When
asked for their views, twenty-three of the California public defenders answered this
question. One half of this group of respondents believed that felony and
misdemeanor caseloads should be at or below the national standards. The majority
of those respondents who believed the felony and misdemeanor caseloads could
exceed the national standards were from counties with populations of 500,000 or
less. The median for non-capital felonies was 170 per year. The median for nontraffic misdemeanors was 450 per year.
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that reported excessive caseloads as a significant problem, also
reported a significant problem with turnover.46
ABA Standards for Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-5.3,
specifically states that indigent defense providers should not "accept
workloads that, by reason of their excessive size, interfere with the
quality of representation .... .. This standard further provides:

Whenever defender organizations, individual defenders, assigned
counsel or contractors for services determine, in the exercise of their
best professional judgment, that the acceptance of additional cases
or continued representation in previously accepted cases will lead to
the furnishing of representation lacking in quality or to the breach of
professional obligations, the defender organization, individual
defender, assigned counsel or contractor for services must take such
steps as may be appropriate to reduce their pending or projected
caseloads, including the refusal of further appointments. Courts
should not require individuals or programs to accept caseloads that
will lead to the furnishing of representation
lacking in quality or to
48
the breach of professional obligations.
2. Investigators
One hundred percent (100%) of the public defender offices also
reported that excessive investigator workloads were a problem.
Seventy-seven percent (77%) reported that this was a significant, very
significant, or a serious problem. The average ratio was one
investigator for every 4.6 attorneys. The actual ratio of investigators to
attorneys varied widely among offices. In three counties there was
only one investigator for every eight attorneys. One of these offices
handled ten death penalty cases, while the other handled none. Two
offices had no staff investigator and one of these reported that there
was a "very significant problem" in obtaining court approval for
investigative assistance. Investigation may also be hindered by the fact
that more than one half (59%) of the offices reported that the lack of
interpreters was a problem.
46. Inadequate compensation may also be a factor contributing to turnover in
some counties. Over one third (39%) of the public defender offices reported
disparity in salary and benefits when compared to the District Attorney's office.
47. ABA, STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 38.
48. Id.
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Most revealing, however, was the fact that 100% of the offices
reported that the inability to interview prosecution witnesses was a
problem. More than one quarter (27%) of the offices reported that this
presented a "serious problem." This problem is compounded by three
additional factors. First, most defender offices are not contacting
defendants until several days after arrest, so prompt investigation is
impossible. Second, it was reported by both defenders and certified
criminal defense specialists that prosecutors in most counties delay in
turning over requested discovery and fail to provide Brady evidence to
defense counsel. Third, and perhaps most important, many cases are
being disposed of at a readiness/disposition conference with the
district attorney and the trial judge soon after arraignment, where in
some counties a "take it or leave it" offer is often presented by the
prosecution before the defense has had time to conduct a complete
investigation.
B. Time of First Contact
The ABA Standardsfor Criminal Justice state:
Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the
circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts
relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of
conviction .... The duty to investigate exists regardless of the
accused's admissions or statements to defense counsel ..

.

The ABA Ten Principles also require appointment of counsel "as
soon as feasible" and in the commentary to the Third Principle state:

49. ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 38. It may be
thought that an investigation is unnecessary where the defendant admits guilt or
indicates he or she is willing to accept the prosecutor's offer. However, it is defense
counsel's job to test the state's case, not be a guilty-plea facilitator. The importance
of this was brought home to the author, who once represented a juvenile, bound over
to be tried as an adult for armed robbery. Footprints in the snow led from the crime
scene to the defendant's family home, where he was arrested and identified by the
victim as the robber. Although the youthful defendant expressed his willingness to
plead guilty, investigation disclosed that his older brother, who would have faced
life imprisonment as a habitual offender, was the actual assailant. The family,
believing the younger brother would only be sentenced as a juvenile, had kept silent
about the misidentification in order to protect the older brother.
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"Counsel should be furnished upon50 arrest, detention or request and
usually within 24 hours thereafter.
The State Bar of California's Guidelines on Indigent Defense
Services Delivery Systems also observe in the "Standards of
Representation" section that indigent defense providers have the
responsibility to conduct an "in-depth factual inquiry" in a timely
manner. 5 1 Only one public defender office reported that it establishes
contact with an indigent accused prior to arraignment. 52 The majority
of offices are appointed at the initial arraignment on a felony charge
and briefly make first contact with an in-custody defendant at that
time.53 Eight offices indicated that they were not appointed until after
arraignment. The time public defenders make first contact with their
clients varies widely, as shown in Figure 8. Only one office reported
that contact was made with an in-custody felony defendant within
twenty-four hours after arrest. Less than one half (48%) made first
contact between one-to-two days after arrest. Eight offices made first
contact between three-to-five days and three offices did not make
contact until more than five days after arrest.
First Contact with indigent Accused
50%
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50. ABA, TEN

PRINCIPLES,

supra note 9, at 2.

37, at 8-9.
52. The San Diego Public Defender's office, in a joint venture with California
Western School of Law, established the San Diego Bail Project in 2000. Under this
program, law students interview recent arrestees at the Central Jail, verify
information necessary for accurate bail determinations, and represent indigent
defendants at their arraignment, arguing for release or reduced bail. See discussion
infra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
53. This was also true with respect to misdemeanors, although a higher number
(40%) of the offices were not appointed until after arraignment.
51.

CALIFORNIA STATE BAR STANDARDS, supra note
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The National Study Commission's Guidelinesfor Legal Defense
Systems, Standard 1.2 (Time of Entry) provides:
Effective representation should be available for every eligible
person as soon as:
(a) The person is arrested or detained, or
(b) The person reasonably believes that a process will commence
which might result in a loss of liberty or the imposition of a legal
disability54 of a criminal or punitive nature, whichever occurs
earliest.

Standard 1.3 (Procedures for Providing Early Representation: Program
Responsibilities) further provides:
In order to ensure early representation for all eligible persons, the
defender office or assigned counsel program should:
(a) Respond to all inquiries made by, or on behalf of, any eligible
person whether or not that individual is in the custody of law
enforcement officials;
(b) Establish the capability to provide emergency representation on
a 24-hour basis;
(c) Implement systematic procedures, including daily checks of detention facilities to ensure that prompt representation is available to
all persons eligible for services; ... and

(f) Publicize its services in the media.
Upon initial contact with a prospective client, the defender or
assigned counsel should offer specific advice as to all relevant
constitutional or statutory rights, elicit matters of defense, and
direct investigators to commence fact investigations, collect
information relative to pre-trial release, and make a preliminary
determination of eligibility for publicly provided defense services.
Where the defender or assigned counsel interviews a
prospective client and it is determined that said person is ineligible
for publicly provided representation, the attorney should decline
the case and, in accordance with appropriate procedure, assist the
person in obtaining private counsel. However, should immediate
service be necessary to protect that person's interest, such service
should be rendered until the person has had the opportunity to

54. NATIONAL STUDY

COMMISSION,

supra note 44, at 501.
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retain private counsel.5 5
The California State Bar Standards also emphasize that
institutional public defenders are to provide "comprehensive services"
56
and declare that there "should exist no gap in the services spectrum."
Citing California Government Code section 27706, the State Bar
Standards observe that the "institutional defender need not wait until
court appointment to commence representation of a client. 57
Government Code section 27706 provides:
The public defender shall perform the following duties:
(a) Upon request of the defendant or upon order of the court, the
public defender shall defend ... any person who is not financially
able to employ counsel and who is charged with the commission of
any contempt or offense triable in the superior courts at all stages
of the proceedings, including the preliminary examination. The
public defender shall, upon request, give counsel and advice to
such person about any charge against the person upon which the
public defender is conducting the defense .... 58
Many public defender offices have heeded the spirit of the State
Bar Standards and provide representation even before arrest.5 9
55. Id. at 501-02.
56. CALIFORNIA STATE BAR STANDARDS, supra note 37, at 11.
57. Id. at 8.
58. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 27706(a) (West 2009).
59. See, e.g., County of San Bernardino Public Defender, FAQ,
http://www.co.san-bernardino.ca.us/PublicDefender/faqs.htm (last visited Feb. 6,
2009). The FAQ section provides:
What should I do if I believe I am under law enforcement investigation in
San Bernardino? If you have reason to believe you are under investigation
by San Bernardino law enforcement, you should contact the San
Bernardino County Public Defender either by telephone at 909-382-7639
or by email through the Department's internet website at www.sbcpd.com.
Consultation with an attorney is important so that you can understand your
rights, responsibilities and the potential outcomes of any law enforcement
investigation. Most law enforcement investigators will understand and
must respect your desire to first speak with an attorney. Any consultation
about your own potential case with the San Bernardino County Public
Defender will be completely confidential. This Department will accept
collect calls regarding San Bernardino County criminal or civil
commitment legal matters.
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However, other defenders state in the Frequently Asked Questions
(FAQ) of their web page that they cannot provide representation until
appointed by the court. 60 While Government Code section 27706
appears to impose a mandatory duty upon the public defender to
provide advice about a criminal charge upon request, that section is
ambiguously drafted because the words "defend

. .

. at all stages" can

be narrowly construed to include only critical stages of a criminal
proceeding. 6 ' The duty to advise, moreover, only applies to a charge
"upon which the public defender is conducting the defense" which

Id.; see also Santa Barbara Public Defender, FAQ, http://www.countyofsb.org/
defender/default.aspx?id=4064. The section provides:
When and how does one apply for the services of the public defender?
When: The services of the office are available seven days a week, 24
hours a [day] for emergency needs. Attorneys are on call during non-office
hours and may be reached at in the north county at (805)705-9092 and in
the south county at (805)705-9093. Any indigent person who is about to
be arrested, charged with a misdemeanor or more serious crime may
request our assistance. All law enforcement agencies in the county are
regularly mailed a list of on call attorneys and reminded that we are
available to respond to requests for services (such as when a suspect seeks
the advice of an attorney prior to interrogation) quickly. By law these
numbers are to be posted in any place of detention so that a person being
arrested may contact us at that time.
Id.
60. See, e.g., Monterey Public Defender Office, FAQ, http://000sweb.co.
monterey.ca.us/pubdef/FAQs.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2009). The section provides:
Can I drop by the Public Defender's Office for legal advice if the court
hasn't appointed me? No. Our office welcomes the public to drop by
however; the Public Defender is only allowed to represent clients that the
court has appointed. If you need general information our office may be
able to assist.
Id. It should be noted that this office reported that it had serious excessive attorney
and investigator workloads, had no paralegal staff, and had handled a death penalty
case while laboring under caseloads that exceed national standards. Asking such an
office to provide additional services would obviously require additional resources.
61. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. It is not suggested that this is a
correct interpretation, only that it is a possible one. The right to counsel at a post
charge line-up and the right to consult an attorney before submitting to custodial
interrogation are of course well established, but an accused can waive those rights
without such consultation if they do not think counsel is readily available. Early
representation is also needed to assist in obtaining pre-trial release, and of course to
commence an immediate investigation.
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also implies there has been an appointment. 62 This section should be
amended to clarify the duty of the primary indigent defense provider
in each county to furnish advice prior to formal appointment. Early
representation is essential to obtaining pre-trial release and can be
critical in cases requiring immediate investigation.
There is also an additional reason to ensure prompt representation
is provided to the indigent accused. Public defender offices in fourteen
of the thirty-three public defender counties reported that they
frequently determine the disposition of a felony case at a disposition
conference with the district attorney and judge held prior to the
preliminary hearing, which is set within ten days following
arraignment if the defendant is held in custody. 63 Given the fact that
most defenders are not appointed until arraignment, there is little time
64
to conduct an investigation for an in-custody defendant.
C. DNA and other Forensic Testing
The ABA Ten Principles mandate "parity between defense
counsel and the prosecution with respect to resources ' ' 65 and state that
there should be separate funding for litigation support services. 66 In
the wake of numerous scandals involving the falsification of forensic
evidence, it has become increasingly clear that the defense must have
the ability to conduct its own independent forensic investigation. For
example, in Dallas, fake drugs planted by police were used to convict
more than forty innocent defendants. 67 In West Virginia, crime lab
62. See supra note 58 (emphasis added).
63. By statute the preliminary hearing must be held within ten court days
following arraignment for a defendant held in custody. CAL. PENAL CODE § 859(b)
(West 2009).
64. A staff attorney has to be assigned to the case before an in-depth interview
with the defendant normally takes place. Because this can take several days
following arraignment, the window for investigation can be quite small. See, e.g.,
County of Ventura Public Defender, FAQ, http://www.pubdef.countyofventura.org/
indexfiles/faq.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2009) ("When do I meet my Public
Defender? There will be a Public Defender in court at your first appearance. Often
that attorney will not be your permanent Public Defender. It takes a few days for
your case to be assigned to your personal Public Defender.").
65. ABA, TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 3.
66. Id.
67. See Megan K. Stack, Drug Busts Gone Bad, Then Worse, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
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superstar Fred Zain was finally exposed after sixteen years of
fraudulently manipulating forensic evidence test results to win
victories for the prosecution. 68 In Riverside County, California, it was
recently revealed that a crime lab technician falsified hundreds of drug
and alcohol reports while working with a company that contracted
with law enforcement agencies to provide testing to confirm drug or
69
alcohol intoxication.
Our study disclosed that while funds are in theory supposed to be
available for the defense for forensic testing, one half (50%) of the
institutional public defenders experienced difficulty obtaining DNA
testing and an almost equal number (48%) had difficulty obtaining
other forensic testing. Over one third (34%) of these offices were
located in counties having a population between 100,000 to 250,000.
However, this problem was widespread and existed in counties of all
sizes. Over two thirds (70%) of the institutional public defenders
responding to our questionnaire favored establishing a forensic
laboratory available to both the defense and prosecution, which would
be operated as an independent agency. Twenty-five percent (25%) of
these respondents strongly favored such a laboratory. Eighty-two
percent (82%) of the certified criminal defense specialists favored, and
over half (58%) strongly favored such an agency. Those disfavoring
this proposal indicated that they did not believe such a laboratory
could be truly independent if law enforcement agencies were involved
as clients.
D. Expert Witnesses
A reputable expert witness is often critical to mounting an
effective defense, especially when, for example, a defendant's sanity
is at issue, or when issues involving forensic evidence are disputed. In
such cases victory can often turn on which side's experts have the
better credentials. While some public defender offices have budgeted
funds from which to retain such expert assistance, other offices must
5, 2002, at A-l, availableat http://articles.latimes.com/2002/apr/05/news/mn-36338.
68. George Castelle, Fake Data, Wrongful Convictions: Learning from a

Crime Lab FraudFiasco, 19 CORNERSTONE 9 (1997).
69. See KPSP Local 2 News, Riverside Lab Worker Admits to Falsifying

Reports, Mar. 5, 2009, http://www.kpsplocal2.comGlobal/story.asp?S=9953780.
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obtain court approval for such assistance. Surprisingly, almost one
third (30%) of the offices reported having difficulty obtaining such
approval. Moreover, even when such assistance is approved, there is
still a lack of equality in funding between the defender office and the
district attorney's office. Over one half (56%) of the institutional
public defender offices reported that they are handicapped by the lack
of funds sufficient to obtain experts that match the district attorney's
experts.
E. Assistance in Sentencing Mitigation
Over sixty-two percent (62%) of the public defender offices
reported that the lack of expert assistance at the sentencing stage was a
problem. The disparity among offices was striking especially with
respect to the death penalty. Citing ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice, the U.S. Supreme Court established in Wiggins v. Smith70 and
Rompilla v. Beard71 that it is imperative that defense counsel
investigate "all reasonably available mitigating evidence" including
family social history, which may be relevant to reduce a defendant's
sentence. 72 Only nine offices, however, had staff personnel with a
Masters degree in social work (MSW) to assist in such investigations.
Even fewer offices (four) had a full-time death penalty mitigation
specialist on staff. Nine offices, that had represented collectively
thirty-three death penalty clients, had no such staff assistance at all.
While one of these offices was in a metropolitan county (over 1
million population), the majority were in counties having a population
ranging from 100,000 to 500,000. 7 1 Only twelve offices had personnel
specifically assigned to develop sentencing alternatives for clients in
non-capital cases. While a bare majority (53%) of offices had
paralegals on staff, fourteen offices had no such staff assistance.

70. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
71. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
72. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524-25 (citing ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, supra note 37); Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387 (citing ABA, STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 38; and ABA, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT
AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (1989)).
73. Four counties were class VI (100,000-250,000) and three were class V
(250,000+ to 500,000).
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F. Training
Fifty-nine percent (59%) of the responding public defender
offices reported that the lack of a full-time training director presented
a problem and three offices felt this was a serious problem. Defenders
reported a need for training in basic trial skills, motion practice, jury
selection, DNA and forensic evidence, handling expert testimony,
mental defenses, and immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Only
a few offices reported that the lack of funds to attend training
programs or the lack of training programs in their area was a
significant problem. More defenders felt that the lack of time to attend
training programs was a problem, which of course is one of the ripple
effects of excessive caseloads.
G. Qualificationsand Supervision
When asked what level of experience was required before an
attorney was assigned to a serious or violent felony, the majority
(67%) of the public defender offices reported that they required three
or more years of experience. Eight offices, however, reported that two
years or less experience was sufficient. There was a statistically
significant correlation between having an excessive caseload and
using attorneys with less than three years of experience to handle
serious felonies.74
The impact of excessive caseloads is also aggravated when an
office has to handle a death penalty case. Eighteen offices indicated
that they handled one or more death penalty cases during the last
reporting period. Fourteen of these offices also reported having a

74. This correlation was significant at the 95% confidence level, n=23, Chi-

square (df=l), value = 4.329, p.<.0 3 7 . Chi-square is a method of analysis within a
class of statistical procedures known as non-parametric tests. A chi-square analysis
compares the observed, or actual frequency, to what would be expected based on a
random assignment. The chi-square value is deemed "significant," when the

deviation from randomness is so great that one is justified in ruling out the
possibility that the deviation was due to chance. For example, where the probability
of obtaining a deviation from randomness exceeds five in 100 (i.e., P.<.05), it is
accepted practice in scientific research to assume that the results are not due to
chance, but rather to some systematic pattern of behavior. See DENNIS P. SACCUZZO,
PSYCHOLOGY: FROM RESEARCH TO APPLICATIONS

value of chi-square was quite significant.

(1987). In the instant case, the
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significant to serious problem 75 with excessive caseloads. More
startling was the fact that four offices, three of whom had actually
handled a death penalty case during the last year, reported that they
would allow an attorney with only five years experience to handle a
capital case.
The California Rules of Court state than an attorney "must" have
at least ten years of litigation experience in the field of criminal law
before being eligible to serve as lead counsel in a death penalty case.7 6
The majority of responding offices indicated familiarity with this rule.
However, the rule does not place a mandatory duty of compliance
upon public defender offices.7 7 A number of defender offices reported

that they had no set criteria for death penalty cases. One office
responded that they had not seen a death penalty case in twenty years.
It would therefore appear that some offices may not be prepared to
meet the requirements of Rule 4.117(d) if faced with an increase in
death penalty cases in their county.
The majority of public defender offices formally evaluate their
staff attorneys on an annual basis.78 All offices used multiple methods
of evaluation, which included: in-court observation (100%), judicial
contact (77%), and review of closed case files (75%). Over one third
(34%) of the offices had an official policy regarding review of an
attorney's performance if a judicial finding was made that the attorney
was ineffective. These policies were described as including an
75. The phrase "significant to serious" indicates that the respondent marked
either a 3, 4, or 5 on a five-point scale when asked to rank the significance of the
problem. See Part II, Methodology, supra at p. 275 and note 32.
76. CAL. R. CT. R. 4.117(d) (2007). The Rule further requires the attorney to
have tried ten serious or violent felonies including at least two murder trials, be
experienced in the use of expert witnesses, and have received special training in
capital defense. Id. The rule provides an alternate way to qualify for an attorney
without ten years experience, but further states that meeting these minimum
qualifications alone does not entitle an attorney to handle a death penalty case, since
the court must also assess the attorney's background, experience, and training, and
determine that he or she has "demonstrated the skill, knowledge and proficiency"
necessary to competently represent a capital defendant. R. 4.117(b).
77. Subsection "g" of Rule 4.117 only provides that the office "should" assign
an attorney meeting the requirements of the rule. R. 4.117(g) (emphasis added).
78. One office evaluates biannually and two evaluate every six months. One
office reported that it conducted evaluations every six months for "three to four
years" implying that after this time further evaluations were not done.
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investigation into the cause, creation of a corrective action plan, retraining, and sometimes close monitoring of the individual attorney.
H. Independence

Ensuring that both individual defense attorneys and the
management of an indigent defense system remain free from judicial
and political pressure is vital to the ability of that system to fulfill its
role as a necessary check and balance. Without such independence the

ability to provide effective representation is jeopardized. California,
unfortunately, has a sad history of harassment and termination of
public defenders who have had the courage to fight against excessive
caseloads.7 9 Our study found that this type of intimidating pressure
still exists.
The commentary to the ABA Ten Principles states that a
nonpartisan board of trustees should oversee public defender systems
in order to safeguard their independence. 80 None of the responding
public defenders had such a board. All chief defenders are selected by
the county board of supervisors, except in San Francisco, where the
chief defender is elected. 81 Almost three fourths (73.1%) of the
79. See, e.g., Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir.
1993) (describing how the chief public defender, Sheldon Portman, was first
reprimanded, then stripped of a pay raise, and ultimately fired after stating at a
public budget session that his attorneys would face professional disciplinary action
for handling too many cases if the board did not grant his request for additional
lawyers); see also Wilson v. Superior Court, 240 Cal. Rptr. 131 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987); Gail Diane Cox, Public Defenders Find Independence Can Be Precarious,
L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 21, 1986 (both describing other similar incidents). Recently the
Chief Public Defender of Cook County, Illinois, Edwin Burnette, successfully sued
the President of the Cook County Board of Commissioners to prevent interference
with management of the Chicago Public Defender Office. The County Board
President had unilaterally selected thirty-four assistant public defenders for
termination (called layoffs) and had ordered other staff to take unpaid furlough days.
In a unanimous decision, the Illinois Appellate Court ruled that the county board
president "lacked the authority to select whom to hire, fire or retain among the
public defender's staff." Burnette v. Stroger, No. 1-08-2908, slip op. at 32 (1l. App.
Ct. Mar. 30, 2009). Unfortunately the courageous chief defender paid the ultimate
price for this victory as his contract was not renewed. See Hal Dardick, Public
Defender Wins Last Case Over Stroger; County Board Chief has Limited Control of
Appointee's Office, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 1, 2009, at C6.
80.

ABA, TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 2.

81.

In two cases, the power to select the public defender was delegated to the

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

institutional defenders reported that county board pressure to keep
costs down was a problem. 82 Over one third (34%) indicated that this
was a significant to serious problem. 83 Even more disturbing was the
fact that 91% of the institutional public defenders reported that
judicial pressure to expedite cases was a problem in their county.
Fifty-nine percent (59%) stated that this was a significant to serious
problem, with five offices reporting this presented a serious problem.
V. CONTRACT DEFENDERS

Contract defenders are the primary provider of indigent felony
and misdemeanor representation in twenty-four counties. While this
type of system is heavily concentrated in rural counties with
populations of less than 100,000, it also exists in a number of urban
counties. Some counties with a public defender office also use a
contract defender to handle conflicts. 84 There are a wide variety of
arrangements. Eight counties have contracted with a single law firm
that provides various types of representation through branch offices.
Some counties contract with solo practitioners. Several counties, for
example, have four different contract defenders handling different
portions of the caseload and one county has seven separate contract
defenders. The amount spent by counties per capita for contract
county administrator.
82. After presenting the findings of our study to the Fair Commission in July
2007, a chief public defender, who was a member of the Commission, told the
author that at the time they were hired it was made very clear to them that they
would be expected to do the job with the resources given to them and if they could
not, then the Board would find somebody else who would. In California, most
institutional public defenders are appointed by the county board of supervisors and
serve at the will of the board. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27702 (West 2009).
83. See supra note 75 regarding the meaning of "significant to serious."
84. Conflicts of interest arise, for example, when there are multiple codefendants involved in the same crime. In Holloway v. Arkansas, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that automatic reversal of defendant's conviction was required because
prejudice was presumed where, without a hearing, the trial court forced defense
counsel to simultaneously represent three co-defendants over defense counsel's
objection. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488-89 (1978). A conflict of interest
can also arise from a variety of other circumstances. For example, where a
prosecution witness is a former client of defense counsel, counsel's ability to
effectively cross-examine that witness may be compromised by his ethical duty to
keep confidences of the former client.
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defender services varied widely, ranging from a low of $5.85 to a high
of $44.32.
We sent questionnaires to fifty-seven separate contract defenders
and received sixteen responses. 85 Almost half (45%) of the counties
employing contract defenders as their primary indigent defense
provider were represented by these respondents. One half of the
respondents were solo practitioners; the other half were law firms. The
majority indicated that they were appointed at arraignment and
contacted the defendant within one to three days after arrest. However,
three reported that they did not contact an in-custody felony defendant
until more than five days after arrest.
Contract defenders reported having the same difficulty in
investigating cases as institutional public defenders and appeared to
have even less resources. Six contract defenders had no staff
investigators at all. 86 Three respondents reported that obtaining court
approval for funds for an investigator was a "serious" problem. One
office had just two investigators for eighteen attorneys. All but one of
the contract defenders reported that the inability to interview
prosecution witnesses was a problem. Half of these respondents
reported that this was a significant to serious 8 7 problem. Only one in
four reported that they "often" interviewed victims and/or
eyewitnesses prior to a preliminary examination. Seventy-one percent
(71%) reported that this was only rarely or occasionally done. The
disposition of felony cases was most often determined at a disposition
conference held prior to the time scheduled for the preliminary
examination.
The responding contract defenders also lacked other important
support personnel. Only one office had a full-time staff member with
an MSW degree to assist in sentencing and only three offices reported
having paralegals. 88 One half of the contract defenders indicated that
the lack of expert assistance at sentencing was a significant problem.
One office, which had handled a death penalty case during the year,

85. All of those responding provided felony representation. All but one also
provided misdemeanor and juvenile representation. Two thirds were primary
providers and one third handled conflicts cases.
86. Two of these respondents were from the same county.
87. See supra note 75.
88. One office reported having a part-time MSW on staff.
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did not have a mitigation specialist on staff or even a paralegal. This
office reported having a "serious" problem in obtaining court approval
for experts and stated that withholding of Brady evidence by the
prosecutor and judicial pressure to expedite cases were also "serious"
problems.
A majority of the responding contract defenders had felony
caseloads exceeding 150 felonies per year. Only one in four of these
respondents reported that excessive attorney workload and
investigator workloads were a significant problem. The remaining
respondents did not answer this question or indicated that excessive
workloads were only a minor to moderate problem. While some
offices indicated that delayed discovery as well as Brady violations
were a significant or serious 89 problem in their county, almost a third
did not answer this question and the remainder either experienced no
discovery problems or only minor problems. However, a majority
reported that the lack of funds to match the prosecution's experts,
difficulty in obtaining DNA testing, and difficulty in obtaining other
forensic testing were all significant problems. The majority favored
establishing an independent forensic laboratory, with only one
indicating "disfavor" and four expressing "no preference."
All but one of the contract defenders thought that the disparity
between their pay scale and that of the district attorney's was a
problem. Eighty-six percent (86%) viewed this disparity in
compensation as a significant to serious 90 problem. By contrast, only
39% of the institutional public defenders reported having a lack of
salary parity with the prosecutor's office.
None of the contract defenders reported having a serious problem
with training. Although they were from some of the most rural
counties in the state, only two respondents indicated that the lack of
training programs in their area was a significant problem. Three
respondents reported that the lack of funds to attend training programs
was a significant problem. Only four respondents reported having any
training needs. The topics noted were: advocacy/trial techniques,
mental health, sentencing, evidence, and sex crimes.
There was a general lack of uniformity in the level of experience
attorneys were required to have before being allowed to represent
89. See supra note 75.

90. Id.
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clients charged with serious felonies. One office reported that only
one year of experience was needed to handle a serious felony or a
three strikes case. Three offices reported that at least three or four
years would be required, while one said five years, one said ten years,
and one reported that all attorneys in their office had twenty-plus
years experience. Over one third (37%) of the contract defenders did
not answer this question.
In our judicial survey, we asked presiding Superior Court judges
for their input on experience levels needed for effective
representation. Two thirds of the judges responding to our
questionnaire believed that an attorney should have at least three or
more years experience before representing a client charged with a
serious felony. More than one third of the judges, and several certified
criminal defense specialists from counties employing contract
defenders, indicated that the contract defender attorneys were less
experienced than the district attorneys in their county. It should be
noted that judges and certified specialists from counties with
institutional public defender offices and assigned counsel systems also
reported a similar gap in experience in those systems.
Monitoring and supervision of contract defender attorneys also
varied widely. Where a county contracts with a solo practitioner there
is no supervision at all other than general oversight by the judiciary.
While most responding contract defenders who indicated that they
were a law firm had some type of formal review process, one
indicated this only entailed contacting judges for their evaluation of an
attorney's performance. Several offices had no formal review process.
Only four offices indicated that they reviewed closed case files. Only
one contract defender office had an official policy in place to review
an attorney's performance if a judicial finding was made that the
attorney had rendered ineffective assistance.
All but one of the responding contract defenders indicated that
pressure from the county board of supervisors to keep costs down and
judicial pressure to expedite cases presented a problem. While the
county board in most cases selects the contractor, several respondents
noted that the board only appointed who the judges approved. This
practice of judicial involvement in selecting the contractor was also
confirmed by a number of judges who indicated that either the judge
or a judicial committee selected the contract defender in their county.
While input from the judiciary as to the criteria which should be used
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to select a contract defender should be welcomed, the actual selection
of the defender by the judiciary violates national standards which
provide that "the public defense function should be independent from
political influence and subject to judicial supervision only in the same
manner and to the same extent as retained counsel." 9 ' None of the
contracts were for longer than a three-year period. The amount of
compensation awarded was often based upon a fixed fee per case or a
flat fee for the entire projected annual caseload.
While a contract system can be a cost-effective means of
delivering indigent defense services in rural areas having low
caseloads, California has had an unfortunate history with such
systems. In a monograph prepared for the U.S. Justice Department's
Bureau of Justice Assistance, the following disastrous experience with
a contract defender was reported:
In 1997 and 1998, a rural county in California agreed to pay a low
bid contractor slightly more than $400,000 a year to represent half
of the county's indigent defendants. The contractor was a private
practitioner who employed two associates and two secretaries, but
no paralegal or investigator. The contract required the contractor to
handle more than 5,000 cases each year. All of the contractor's
expenses came out of the contract. To make a profit, the contractor
had to spend as little time as possible on each case. In 1998, the
contractor took fewer than 20 cases-less than 0.5 percent of the
combined felony and misdemeanor caseload-to trial.
One of the contractor's associates was assigned only cases
involving misdemeanors. She carried a caseload of between 250
and 300 cases per month. [sic]92 The associate had never tried a case
before a jury. She was expected to plead cases at the defendant's
first appearance in court so she could move on to the next case.
91. ABA, TEN

PRINCIPLES,

supra note 9,at 2. As the commentary points out,

keeping the judiciary from becoming entangled in the oversight and budgetary

concerns of the indigent defense system is also important to protect the judiciary
from undue political pressure and thus helps to ensure judicial independence. Id. The
ABA and other national standards recommend that a nonpartisan board should be
established to oversee all types of defense systems, whether institutional public
defender, contract defender or assigned counsel system. Id. (citing other national
standards).
92. The national standard is 400 misdemeanor cases per attorney per year. See
NAC, supra note 8, at 276.
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One afternoon, however, the associate was given a felony case
scheduled for trial the following week. The case involved multiple
felony and misdemeanor charges. When she looked at the case file,
the associate discovered that no pretrial motions had been filed, no
witness list had been compiled, no expert witnesses had been
endorsed, and no one had been subpoenaed. In short, there had been
no investigation of any kind into the case, and she had no one to
help her with the basics of her first jury trial.
The only material in the case file was five pages of police reports.
In these reports she found evidence of a warrantless search, which
indicated strong grounds for suppression. She told the judge she
was not ready to proceed and that a continuance was necessary to
preserve the defendant's Sixth Amendment [sic] right to counsel.
The continuance was denied. The associate refused to move
forward with the case. The contractor's other associate took over
the case and pled the client guilty to all charges. The associate who
had asked for a continuance was fired.
In this California county, critics' worst fears about indigent defense
contract systems came true. When contract systems are created for
the sole purpose of containing costs, they pose significant risks to
the quality of representation and the integrity of the criminal justice
93
system.
In a deposition arising out of a lawsuit brought by the associate who
had been summarily dismissed, the contract defender stated that he
was able to handle a high volume of cases because he pled 70% of his
clients guilty at the first court appearance after spending thirty seconds
explaining the prosecutor's offer. 94 The county has since established
95
an institutional public defender office.
Testimony before the Fair Commission also revealed that some
counties employing contract defenders solicited bidding wars in an
93. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, CONTRACTING
FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES: A SPECIAL REPORT 1-2 (2000).
94. CAL. COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT
RECOMMENDATIONS ON FUNDING OF DEFENSE SERVICES IN CALIFORNIA 8-9

AND

(Apr.

14, 2008) [hereinafter FAIR COMMISSION] (citing deposition of Jack Suter in
Fitzmaurice-Kendrick v. Suter, Civ. S-98-0925 (ED. Cal. 1999)). The lawsuit
reportedly resulted in a substantial settlement for the plaintiff. Id. at 9.
95. Id.

306

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

effort to cut back on the cost of indigent defense services. The
Commission reported the story of one contract defender of long
standing who had repeatedly fought off low bidders in the past with
the support of the judiciary. His budget, which had been 41% of the
District Attorney's budget in 2000, declined to only 27% of
prosecutor's budget in 2005.96 Yet in 2006, he was undercut by a bid
that was almost 50% less than his submission. 97 As a result, this
veteran defender lost the contract he had repeatedly renewed since
1990. According to the Commission:
He was undercut by a bid from John A. Barker & Associates, now
operating as Richard A. Ciummo & Associates. Ciummo now
contracts with eight California counties to provide defense
services.... Ciummo's operation has been described as the "WalMart Business Model" for providing defense services, "generating
volume and cutting costs in ways his government-based
counterparts can't and many private-sector competitors won't." Mr.
Ciummo responds that he operates on a single-digit profit margin,
and substantial savings result from hiring attorneys on a contract
basis that does not include expensive benefit and retirement
packages. While his contracts with counties provide separate
reimbursement for interpreters and expert witness98fees, there is no
separate reimbursement for investigative services.
The Commission noted that the successful bidder's website
contains an advertisement stating: "What Would Your County Do
With Hundreds of Thousands of Dollars?" The advertisement suggests
the answer ("Better schools? Better fire protection? More police?
Improved roads? More parks?") and boasts: "Every county we have
contracted with has saved substantial funds over their previous

96. Id. at 10.

97. Id. at 10-11. The existing defender's bid was $28 million and the
competitor's winning bid was $15 million. This amount was later adjusted during
contract negotiations to $16.8 million. SYSTEMIC FACTORS I, supra note 4, at 33
n.60.
98. FAIR COMMISSION, supra note 94, at 11-12 (quoting Cheryl Miller,
CaliforniaDefense Firm Borrows Wal-Mart Business Model, THE RECORDER, Dec.

26, 2007).
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method of providing these services. Additionally, our firm has an
99
excellent record of containing cost increases."
In hard economic times, competitive bidding can obviously lead
to a dangerous downward spiral of cost cutting. If cost is the only
touchstone, contract systems can result in bids that provide an
inadequate number of inexperienced attorneys who are given little
training, supervision, or support services. Awarding contracts on the
basis of a flat fee contract also creates an inherent conflict of interest
because of the economic incentives to maximize profits. Allowing
competitive bidding for defense services contracts creates further
pressures to provide the bare minimum in services, especially when
the contract is open-ended with respect to the number of cases the
contractor might be required to take. Therefore, common sense would
suggest that contracts for indigent defense services be awarded on a
cost-plus basis for a pre-determined number of cases. The contract
bidder should be required to set forth in their proposal the number of
attorneys that will be hired to handle that caseload, their minimum
qualifications, and compensation. This should likewise apply to staff
investigators and other support personnel. In addition, the proposal
should also provide a plan showing how staff attorneys will be
supervised, and a case management information system for ensuring
that the contractor's performance can be monitored by outside
auditors. Only then will a county board supervisor be able to
intelligently assess the value of the contract proposal. Only then will
the competition be about cutting the amount of profit rather than
cutting the quality of representation provided.
VI. ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS
Only San Mateo County uses an assigned counsel system
administered by the local bar association as the primary provider of
indigent defense services. However, assigned counsel systems exist in
virtually every county in order to handle multiple defendant cases.
Over 60% of the certified criminal defense specialists across the state
who responded to our questionnaire had been appointed to represent
an indigent accused during the past year. While the majority indicated
99. Id. at 11 n.4. The law firm still maintains the same advertisement. See
Richard A. Ciummo & Associates, http://www.ciummolaw.com/ (last visited Feb.
28, 2009).
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they were selected by an assigned counsel panel administrator, some
indicated that they were selected directly by the court.' 00 While the
majority were notified of their appointment within three days after
arrest, more than one in four (29%) indicated it could be more than
four days after arrest.
The method of compensation varied widely. Sixty-five percent
(65%) of the certified specialists indicated that they were paid an
hourly rate as appointed counsel. The amount ranged from a low of
$40 an hour to a high of $125 an hour for a non-capital felony,
excluding trial. Over 80% of these respondents reported the normal
hourly rate was less than $100 per hour. In some counties, there was a
cap on the number of hours. In other counties, assigned counsel were
paid a flat fee per case, which included trial. This obviously creates an
economic incentive to dispose of the case without trial and thus
generates an inherent conflict of interest, especially in localities where
low assigned counsel fees provide inadequate compensation. A
number of counties use a combination of methods, paying a base
amount per case and then additional amounts per event (e.g.
preliminary hearing) with compensation for trial determined by either
a fixed amount per day or by an hourly rate.
All of the certified specialists responding from San Mateo County
(which has a highly refined system of compensation, providing a base
fee per case plus additional payments per event and trial) indicated
that their fee structure was adequate. This was not true for the rest of
the state, however. When asked to assess the adequacy of assigned
counsel fees, over one half (55%) of the certified specialists
answering, reported that the fee structure in their county did not
provide adequate compensation for investigation, research, or bringing
appropriate motions before disposition. 10 1 Almost two thirds (64%) of
those answering believed that their fee structure did not adequately
compensate an attorney who took a case to trial. 10 2 While only ten
percent of the judges surveyed believed that assigned counsel fees
were inadequate to investigate cases, one in five admitted that the fees
100. A number of judges responding to our questionnaire also indicated that
they or a panel of judges picked assigned counsel. In one county this was done by
the court clerks using a rotation system.
101. n=84. Twenty-five of the 110 certified criminal defense specialists who
returned our questionnaire did not answer this question.
102. n=74.
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were not adequate to compensate an assigned attorney who went to
trial.
Obviously when an appointed attorney is not adequately
compensated, the economic incentives create pressure to quickly
dispose of the case at the initial disposition conference. As one
attorney on an assigned counsel panel for conflicts explained, "Once I
10 3
move beyond the disposition conference, I'm losing money."
VII.

DISPARITY IN RESOURCES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE

10 4
Chief Justice Warren Burger declared in Argersingerv. Hamlin
that "the system for providing counsel and facilities for the defense
should be as good as the system which society provides for the
prosecution."1 0 5 Significant disparities between staffing and resources
allocated to the prosecution and the defense result in excessive
workloads in defender offices, which in turn lead to delays in justice
for both victims and defendants. Such an imbalanced criminal justice
system also promotes ineffective assistance of counsel, which gives
rise to more appeals, retrials, and unnecessary expense. Our study
found two different types of disparity with respect to the adequacy of
resources for indigent defense in California. First, there is a dramatic
disparity between funding for the prosecution when compared to the
defense. Second, there is an equally disturbing disparity between
counties in their ability and/or commitment to fund indigent defense
services. The resources allocated to indigent defense systems vary
dramatically across the state. The statewide average spent on indigent
defense is $19.62 spent per capita. Sutter County, with a population of
91,000, however, spends only $5.85 per capita, while Alpine, given6
10
its small population of less than 15,000, spends $44.32 per capita.
Moreover, Alpine County spends almost four times more on

103. Telephone interview with criminal defense attorney serving on assigned
counsel panel in a metropolitan county (May 2007).
104. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (extending the right to counsel
to misdemeanor cases).
105. Id. at 43 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
106. The per capita budgets for prosecution also ranged widely from $7.61 per
person in Kings County to $175.23 per person in Alpine County. SYSTEMIC
FACTORS I, supra note 4, at 17 (Table 4).
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prosecution than defense, while Sutter County
spends over five times
10 7
defense.
on
does
it
as
prosecution
on
much
as
Even within the same population class there are marked
disparities. Butte County, with a population of 217,000, spends less
than $10.00 per capita on indigent defense, while Yolo County, with a
population of 190,000, spends almost $31.00 per capita. Despite this,
there is still a glaring disparity between resources allocated to indigent
defense and prosecution in Yolo County. Such disparities are
especially troubling when death penalty cases are involved.
The Yolo County Public Defender and District Attorney handled
one death penalty case during the annual reporting period we
examined. However, as Table 1 below shows, the Public Defender
office did so with just under one half of the resources that were
allocated to the prosecution. Viewed from the standpoint of resources
per attorney, the prosecutor had the advantage of over $100,000 more
per staff attorney than the public defender.10 8 Significant problems
with the lack of prompt discovery and the withholding of Brady
evidence by the prosecution were also reported for this county.
Y.

Cont

Tota Buge

# ofRsore
atrs

pe

atore

Table 1. Yolo County Resource Comparison
The disparity in funding between prosecution and defense was
also seen in counties having similar caseloads. As shown in Table 2,
El Dorado and Humboldt counties have comparable populations and
107. SYSTEMIC FACTORS II, supra note 4, at 2 (Figure 1).
108. This comparison actually overstated the resources per public defender
staff attorney because not all of the indigent defense budget goes to the public
defender office. It also ignores the additional manpower resources available to the
prosecution from the city police, the county sheriff's department, and the state
highway patrol.
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comparable felony and misdemeanor caseloads. Yet El Dorado spends
two and half million dollars more on prosecution-a disparity of
$24.49 per capita.
County

Population

Total

#

Defense

Prosecution

Per

Caseload

felony
cases

Budget

Budget

Capita
Disparity

El

133,000

4,342

1,248

$2,750,000

$6,960,000

$31.65

Dorado
Humboldt

176,000

3,701

1,415

$2,890,000

$4,150,000

$7.16

Table 2. Comparison of El Dorado and Humboldt Counties
The total amount allocated annually to indigent defense by county
governments was $727 million while the amount spent on prosecution
totaled $1.2 billion. 10 9 Statewide, the statistical mean (average)
indigent defense budget was $14 million, while the statistical mean
(average) prosecutorial budget was $24 million. "0
More than eight out of ten criminal defendants prosecuted in
California Superior Courts require appointment of counsel."' Yet data
from the fiscal year 2006-07 county budgets show that for every dollar
spent on prosecution, California counties spent on average only fiftythree cents on indigent defense.

109. SYSTEMIC FACTORS I, supra note 4, at 16.
110. Id.
111. We sent questionnaires to the presiding Superior Court judge and where
applicable, the criminal supervising judge in each county, and received responses
from thirty-eight judges. To encourage an adequate response, judges were not asked
to indicate their county. We thus do not have indigency rates for individual counties.
The overwhelming majority of the responding judges (84%) reported that they had
previously served as prosecutors or defense counsel. These judges were asked to
assess the percent of their felony criminal docket that required appointment of
counsel. Some judges reported indigency rates as high as 95%. With the assistance
of Professor Donald Smythe of California Western School of Law, we undertook a
statistical analysis of these judicial responses and determined that we could reject
the hypothesis that the indigency rate was as low as 85% in favor of the alternative
that it was higher with a 98% level of confidence. We therefore would expect the
indigent defense budget to be higher than 85% of the prosecution's budget.
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Table 3. Statewide Comparison of Prosecution and Indigent Defense Budgets
Defense Budget

County
Alameda
Alpine
Amador
Butte
Calaveras
Colusa
Co
Costa
Del Norte
El Dorado
Fresno
Glenn
Humboldt
Imoerial

2

$39,348,805
$55,000
$561.613
$2.158.276
$433,500
$285,715
20016.94

Prosecution Budget

Difference in $

Defense Ratio

3

$52,979,521
$217,460
$3.150,723
$8,604,246
$!,350,949
$656,543
$27,334,381

$13,630,716
$162,460
$2,589, 10
$6445970
$917.449
$370,828
$7,37440

74%
25%
18%
25%
32%
44%
73%

$6.960.087
$21,928,145
$980 084
$4.151.423
$1958.689

$4,209,952
$9,419.271
$639,421
$1.252.510
$1.845.869

40%
57%
35%
70%
53%

$22,591,632
$1,124,434
$2,018,832
$618,747
$294.647,000
$14,145,763

$6,810,692
$224,434
$1,029,223
$99A67
$97,859,000
$8,535,018

-

lnyo

Kern
Kings
Lake
Lassen
Los Angeles
Maderaare
Main
-Maiposa
Mendocino
-Merced
Modoc
Mono

$2,750.135
$12.508.874
$340.663
$2,898.913
$2.112,820
.......
$15.780.940
$900,000
$989.609
$519,280
$196,788,000
$5,610,745
$2.254.711
$4.520,530
-$485,000

-Monterey
-Napa
Nevada
Orange
Placer
-Plumas
-Riverside
Sacramento
San Benito
San Bernardi no 1
-San Diego
San Francisco
-San Joaquin
-San Luis Obispo
San Mateo
-Santa Barbara
Santa Clara
Santa Cruz
Shasta
Sierra
Siskiyou
Solano
Sonoma
Stansilaus
Sutter
-Tehama
Trinity€
-Tulare
-Tuolumne
-Ventura
-Yolo
Yuba

$3,612,137
$7,609,293

$1,357,426
$3,088,763

$1,646,222

$1,161,222

$5,447,046
$3,716,962
$1!,800,407
$65,277,088
$10,283,275
$353,498
$41.348,356
$22,749,772
$641,486
$27.262.282
$65,889,048
$22.316.010
$14,946,141
$4,329,000
$14.624,218
$8.209,134
$38,351.909
$7,322.155
$4,447,632
$91,708
$655,143
$9,210.446
$7.780,233
$8,022,104
$534.700
---$502,500

$13,369,056
$7,040,009
$3,263,407
$90,456,643
$16,114,921
$911,466
$84,264,984
$37.659,643
$1,037,973
$61,943,252
$118,940,401
$37,5K9853
$17,711,400
$10,487,000
$20.707,020
$14,502,927
$74.084,132
$10,369,301
$6,350,152
$238,208
$2,203,960
$18,605.916
$10.679.993
$13,048,706
$2,902.618

$7,922,010
$3,323,047
$1,463,000
$25,179,555
$5,831!,646
$557,968
$42,916,628
$14.909.89T4
$396,487
$34-6'0,7'
$53,651,333
$15,253,843
$2,765,259
$6,158,000
$6,0821802
$6,293.793
$35-732.223
$3.047.146
$1,902,520
$146,500
$1,548,817
$9,395,470
$2.899.760
$5.026,602
$2,367T918

$1,044,025

$541,5 25

$7.489.699

$14.613.242

$7,123, 543

$14,973,31
$34,890,00-1
$ 5!.E47.3 68
$11,444,209
$1.030.468 1$1.740,275
1

iStatewide

$19,916,670
$5.596.841
$709,807 159%

Average Defense Ratio

70%
80%
49%
84%
67%
40%
--...
62%
59%
29%
41%
53%
55%
72%
64%
39%
49%
60%
62%
44%
55%
5%
84%
41%
71%
57%
52%
71%
70%
38%
30%
50%
73%
61%
18%
48%
51%
43%
51%

53%

1. Data represents fiscal year 2006-2007 except as follows: Lake, Monterey, Plumas, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara,
Siskiyou and Yuba =FY05-06; Amador, Kings, Main and San Benito =FY04-05. Years are the same for both
prosecution and indigent defense budgets.
2. Includes total indigent defense budget for all providers in the county.
3. The proportion of the prosecution budget that the indigent defense budget equals.
4. "--" indicates no budget data was reported by the county to the State Controller.
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Table 3 shows this disparity by county, both in terms of actual dollar
difference and in terms of the fraction of the prosecution's budget
represented by the entire indigent defense budget. This gap is referred
to as the defense ratio.
The ABA Ten Principles states that there should be parity
between the resources allocated to the prosecution and the indigent
defense system.1 12 The Commentary to Principle 8 states: "There
should be parity of workload, salaries and other resources (such as
benefits, technology, facilities, legal research, support staff,
paralegals, investigators, and access to forensic services and experts)
between prosecution and public defense."' 13 While indigency rates
vary from county to county, it can reasonably be expected, based upon
the data we collected from judges concerning indigency rates, that the
indigent defense budget would be equal to at least 85% of the
prosecution's budget." 4 However, only a handful of counties even
approached this type of parity. In the aggregate it would therefore
appear that indigent defense is under-funded statewide by at least 300
million dollars. 115 Two counties had indigent defense budgets that
only amounted to 18% of the prosecutor's budget. Over half of the
counties had indigent defense budgets below 70% of the prosecution's
budget.
It has been suggested that this disparity may be explained in part
by the fact that the district attorney's office requires additional staff to
screen all arrests before filing. However, California State Bar
Standards, citing section 27706 of the California Government Code,
emphasize that the public defender is also responsible for providing
representation at the arrest stage1 16 Moreover, an examination of

112. ABA, TEN PRINCIPLES,

supra note 9, at 3.

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. The total prosecution budget ($1,218,481,004) x 85% = $1,035,708,854.
The total actual indigent defense expenditure, however, is only $726,773,196,
leaving a shortfall of $308,935,658.
116. California State Bar Standards require the public defender to provide
"comprehensive services" and provide representation "at all stages" upon request of
any indigent person charged with an "offense triable in the superior courts."
CALIFORNIA STATE BAR STANDARDS, supra note 37, at 11; see SYSTEMIC FACTORS
I, supra note 4, at 25.
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comparative workloads of district attorneys and indigent defense
providers shows that the small incremental segment of a district
attorney's workload represented by screening arrests is more than
offset by the much larger additional workload imposed on the indigent
defense system to handle non-traffic misdemeanor cases occurring
within cities that are not prosecuted by the county district attorney's
17
office. "'
117. The San Diego City Attorney's Office, for example, handles all
misdemeanors occurring within the city limits. Many of these cases are serious
offenses, as indicated by the fact that in addition to its regular Criminal Division
staff, the City Attorney has a separate Domestic Violence and Special Victims Unit
which handles misdemeanor cases involving domestic violence, elder abuse, sexual
battery, stalking, and child abuse, including neglect, molestation, child pornography,
and statutory rape. See City Attorney of San Diego, Criminal Division,
http://www.sandiego.gov/cityattorney/divisions/domestic.shtml (last visited Mar. 23,
2009).
Subtracting the number of actual filings from the total number of arrests
determines the additional workload a district attorney's office has with respect to
screening arrests. Comparing that aggregate number (arrests not prosecuted) with
the aggregate number of misdemeanor defendants handled by local city attorney's
offices, which the indigent defense system would have to represent (but the county
district attorney's office would not), shows that the additional prosecution workload
to screen arrests is more than offset by the additional misdemeanor defense
workload. There were 534,460 felony arrests statewide in 2006. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
CTR., OFFICE OF ATT'Y GEN., CALIFORNIA CRIMES viii (2006), available at
http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/publications/canddlcdO6/preface.pdf. The Judicial Council of
California's Court Statistics Report for fiscal year 2005-2006 reports that there were
289,206 felony filings. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., 2007 COURT STATISTICS
REPORT: STATEWIDE CASELOAD TRENDS 51 (2007) (covering fiscal years 19961997 through 2005-2006) [hereinafter 2007 COURT STATISTICS REPORT], available
at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/csr2007.pdf. The net additional
statewide prosecution workload to screen cases not filed as felonies is thus 248,960
cases. This figure is more than offset, however, by the additional workload public
defenders must undertake to represent misdemeanor defendants who are prosecuted
by the local city attorney's office rather than the district attorney.
The Judicial Council reported 625,233 non-traffic misdemeanor filings for
the same period. Id. Conservatively assuming that only 50% of these defendants
were city cases prosecuted by city attorneys (as opposed to misdemeanors occurring
in unincorporated portions of the county which are prosecuted by the county district
attorney) and were indigent requiring representation by indigent defense counsel,
this still leaves indigent defenders handling 63,656 more cases than district
attorneys. It hardly needs to be added that competently defending a non-traffic
misdemeanor client also entails a significantly greater amount of work than simply
screening a felony arrest for the purpose of making a charging decision.
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In addition, the indigent defense system must also provide
individual counsel to represent each felony co-defendant, while the
prosecution of multiple co-defendants can be handled by a single staff
attorney. The indigent defense system must also provide
representation to those who face involuntary comnuitment as a result
of mental illness.1 18 These matters are not normally handled by the
district attorney, unless the commitment involves a sexually violent
predator. 119 Therefore, in view of these additional workloads and the
fact that privately retained cases make up only between five to fifteen
percent of the felony docket, one would not expect the workload of a
county's indigent defense system to be substantially lower than the
workload of the county district attorney's office. Yet the disparity in
funding for these two components of the criminal justice system is
substantial.
A. InstitutionalDefenders and ContractDefenders Compared
We found a statistically significant relationship between the size
of the gap in resources and the type of indigent defense provider. The
gap between indigent defense and prosecution is significantly larger in
counties having contract defenders than those with institutional public
defender systems. As Table 4 indicates, thirteen of the twenty-four
contract defender counties have disparities far greater than the state
average. Five of the contract defender counties (Del Norte, Madera,
Mariposa, Modoc and Tehama) are not shown because they reported
no data to the State Controller.

118. There are approximately 14,000 mental health filings in California
annually. 2007 COURT STATISTICS REPORT, supra note 117, at 137 (noting Table
I 1c, named "Mental Health Filings and Dispositions by County, Fiscal Year 2005-

06").
119. A sexually violent predator is a "person who has been convicted of a
sexually violent offense against two or more victims and who has a diagnosed
mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in
that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior."
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) (West 2006).
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Table 4

lpine
Amador
Butte
Calaveras
Colusa
Glenn
Kings
Lake
Mono
Placer
lumas
San Benito
San Luis Obispo
Santa Cruz
ierra
utter
rinity
uba

25%
18%
25%
32%
44%
35%
80%
49%
29%
64%
39%
62%
41%
71%
38%
18%
48%
59%

While an on-site docket study would be necessary to
comprehensively assess the impact on the quality of representation
provided by such chronically under-funded counties, one danger sign
is whether cases are simply processed by guilty pleas or contested
before a jury. We therefore looked at court data from all counties
regarding the rate at which Superior Court cases are tried to a jury. We
found a statistically significant relationship between the type of
provider and the rate of felony jury trials. Institutional public defender
systems were twice20 as likely to take a case to jury trial as contract
defender systems.'
120. This analysis was conducted on court data obtained from the California
Judicial Council for fiscal year 2004-2005. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., 2006 COURT
STATISTICS REPORT: STATEWIDE CASELOAD TRENDS (2006) (covering fiscal years
1995-1996 through 2004-2005), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference
/documents/csr2006.pdf The difference was statistically significant at the 98% level
of confidence.
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B. The Widening Gap
The most disturbing finding, however, is that the gap between
prosecution and indigent defense funding appears to be increasing.
Between fiscal year 2003-2004 and fiscal year 2006-2007 the
disparity increased in the aggregate by over 20%. 121 In two counties,
this gap widened by almost 50% over the three-year period and in one
county (San Bernardino) it doubled. Given the current economic
climate of scarce resources, there is a substantial danger that the gap
between prosecution and indigent defense resources will continue to
widen even further.
C. Counties in Danger
Contract defender counties were not the only counties exhibiting
danger signs as a result of significant under-funding. We identified
four objective indicators, which would provide an indication of the
health of a county's indigent defense system. These factors are: 1) a
defense ratio below the mean (i.e., the disparity between prosecution
and defense funding was greater than the state average), 2) a below
average jury trial rate, 3) having one or more death penalty cases, and
4) having no certified criminal defense specialist in the county.

121. We were able to obtain budgetary data for this comparative period for
sixteen counties. The difference in the aggregate amount spent on prosecution and
defense was $117,140,588 in fiscal year 2003-2004. This gap increased to
$211,438,915 in fiscal year 2006-2007.
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Table 5
As Table 5 shows, fourteen counties were found to exhibit at least
three out of four of these factors. Over one half (57%) of these
counties employed contract defender systems and were (with the
exception of Butte County) under 100,000 in population. However,
several urban and two metropolitan counties (San Bernardino and
Santa Clara) also exhibited these danger signs. Santa Clara is one of
the richest counties in the nation, ranking 17th out of 3,000 counties in
terms of per capita income. 1 22 Yet Santa Clara County's indigent
defense system is below the state average in terms of parity with the
prosecution. When state and federal grants to the prosecutor's office
are taken into account it appears that the Santa Clara prosecutor's
budget is more than twice that of all of the indigent defense
components combined. 123 This translates into a dramatic disparity in
122. America's Richest Counties, Forbes.com, http://www.forbes.com/2008/01
/22/counties-rich-income-forbeslife-cxmw_0122realestate.html (last visited Mar.

20, 2009).
123. See

OFFICE OF THE DIST. ATT'Y, COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, FINAL

BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2007 131-36 (2007) [hereinafter SANTA CLARA FINAL
BUDGET]. The Santa Clara District Attorney received $1.4 million from the State of

California's Department of Insurance and $1.9 million from the federal
government's Office of Emergency Services. Id. Other grants included an Anti-
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staffing resources. The District Attorney had 449 budgeted positions,
which increases to 504 if you include the fifty-five personnel
employed in the District Attorney's own crime lab. 24 The crime lab is
funded out of a separate budget financed in part by fines from
convicted drug offenders pursuant to Health and Safety Code section
11372.5.125 As compared to this staff of over 500, the two public
defender offices combined have a budgeted staff of only 206, and one
was facing staffing cuts at the time of our survey. 126 This disparity in
resources is compounded by the reported practice of some Santa Clara
prosecutors to withhold evidence favorable to the defense. 127 News
reports document that even the District Attorney concedes that at least

Drug-Abuse Enforcement Program Fund, Child Abuse Vertical Prosecution Fund,
D.A. Worker's Compensation Fraud Grant Fund, Hi-Tech Identity Theft Program
Fund, and Welfare Fraud Investigation Fund. Id. at 134-35. Combined with county
funds and money from the Public Safety Sales Tax (known as Proposition 172
funds) the prosecutor's budget for 2007 totaled over $86 million. Id. at 134, 144-45.
The total funding for the Santa Clara Public Defender Office, Alternate Public
Defender Office, and Legal Aid Society of Santa Clara County, which administers
an assigned counsel panel to handle conflict of interest cases the Alternative Public
Defender cannot represent, totaled only $42.7 million. Id. at 138-39, 144-45; Legal
Aid Society of Santa Clara County, http://www.legalaidsociety. org/goal.html (last
visited Feb. 26, 2009).
124. SANTA CLARA FINAL BUDGET, supra note 123, at 131-36.
125. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11372.5 (West 2009). Because this
amount was not included in the District Attorney's budget (which was taken from
the county's Final Budget), this additional amount was not included in measuring
the disparity between prosecution and defense.
126. The fiscal year 2007 Final Budget notes that the County Executive
recommended deletion of one senior attorney position. SANTA CLARA FINAL
BUDGET, supra note 123, at 138. The Santa Clara District Attorney's web page
listed the names of 186 attorneys compared to only 122 attorneys for the two
defender offices combined. The County of Santa Clara, Office of the District
Attorney, http://www.santaclara-da.org/portal/site/da/ (follow "District Attorney's
Office Directory" hyperlink; then follow "Attorney Directory" hyperlink) (last
visited Feb. 28, 2009). No comparable cuts in prosecution staff attorneys were found
in the County Executive's Recommendation for the District Attorney's Office. See
SANTA CLARA FINAL BUDGET, supra note 123, at 132-33.
127. See Fredric N. Tulsky, Prosecutors Over the Line, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Jan. 23, 2006, http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_5127908?IADID=Searchwww.mercurynews.com-www.mercurynews.com.

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

of an innocent man for murder has occurred
one wrongful conviction
128
County.
Clara
in Santa
It is significant that in both Santa Clara and San Bernardino
counties the disparity in funding for prosecution and indigent defense
is growing. The gap between the prosecution and defense budget in
Santa Clara County increased from $28,925,070 in fiscal year 20032004 to $35,732,223 in fiscal year 2006-2007-an increase of 24%.
The gap in San Bernardino County increased by 100% (from
$17,365,106 to $34,680,970) during the same period.
Although excessive caseloads were not used as one of the factors
to determine if a county was endangered, Table 5 also includes
whether the indigent defense providers in the endangered county
reported excessive attorney and/or investigator caseloads. Only one of
the contract defenders from the endangered counties responded to our
questionnaire. The institutional public defenders all reported that they
had excessive attorney caseloads, and all but one reported they had
excessive investigator caseloads. The Santa Clara Public Defender and
the Alternate Defender, for example, reported that they labored under
both excessive attorney workloads and excessive investigator
workloads.129 The Santa Clara Public Defender Office handled over
30,000 cases annually with only 101 attorneys (over 300 cases per
with
attorney) and reported that they were on "the knife's edge"
30
respect to whether they could continue to accept new cases.'
128. Id.
129. Defenders were asked: "To what extent does your office confront any of
the following problems?" Excessive attorney workloads and excessive investigator
workloads were among the items listed for consideration. Respondents could mark
"no problem" or could indicate the significance of the problem using a five point
scale in which 1 = minor problem, 3 = significant problem, and 5 = serious problem.
Both Santa Clara respondents rated the significance level at "4" with respect to both
types of excessive workloads.
130. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441,
at 9 (2006) (stating that "[a]ll lawyers, including public defenders, have an ethical
obligation to control their workloads so that every matter they undertake will be
handled competently and diligently."). The Opinion further provides that if the
workload of a public defender prevents her from "provid[ing] competent and
diligent representation to existing clients," she must not accept new clients. Id.; see
also Norman Lefstein & Georgia Vagenas, Restraining Excessive Defender
Caseloads: The ABA Ethics Committee Requires Action, THE CHAMPION, Dec. 2006,

at 10-12, available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/download
s/ABAethicsp10-22.pdf.
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Both offices handled a combined total of eight death penalty cases
during the year. In both offices the ratio of attorneys to investigators
exceeded the standard recommended by the National Study
Commission of three attorneys to one investigator. 3 1 One office
indicated that its attorneys substantially exceeded the ABA Standard
of 150 felonies per attorney per year. 132 The other office did not
answer this question. However, both offices indicated that their
attorneys handled misdemeanor caseloads that substantially exceeded
the ABA minimum 400 cases per attorney per year. 33 The San
Bernardino Public Defender also responded to our questionnaire and
gave similar responses. This office handled seven death penalty cases,
caseloads that substantially
and also had both felony and misdemeanor
1 34
exceeded the ABA Standards.
We do not mean to suggest that these offices we have mentioned
are providing less than adequate representation. However, the pressure
created by the increased demands of death penalty cases in the face of
excessive caseloads for both attorneys and investigators when
aggravated by the magnitude of the increasing disparity in staffing
resources when compared to the prosecution, clearly creates a
significant danger that this could happen. If this is the situation in one
of our nation's wealthiest counties, it paints a bleak picture for the
future of indigent defense in counties across the state that are
financially less well-endowed.
VIII. JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The hope that the Warren Court's landmark decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright135 would ensure equal justice for the criminally accused,

131.

NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION,

supra note 44, at 513. The ratio was four

to one in one office and almost five to one in the other. Id.
132. ABA TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 2.

133. Id.
134. While "caseload" should be adjusted to take into account the adequacy of

support services and the complexity of cases to determine an accurate measurement
of actual "workload," the ABA has stated that these national caseload standards
represent the absolute maximum and "should in no event be exceeded." ABA, TEN
PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 2.
135. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (establishing the right to
appointed counsel at trial in all felony cases).
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regardless of wealth, has proven to be unrealistic. 13 6 As we have seen,
this has been due in part to either the inability or the lack of political
will to adequately fund indigent defense services. 137 But a contributing
factor has also been the failure of the U.S. Supreme Court to
meaningfully enforce the constitutional right to the "effective"
assistance of counsel. 138 This failure can be directly linked to the strict
two-pronged test for ineffectiveness claims established by the
Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington. 139 To establish a violation
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel under this demanding test,
the defendant must show not only a deficient performance by counsel,
but also resulting prejudice. 40 Moreover, in the context of a deficient
performance at trial, proving prejudice requires establishing that but
for the unprofessional error, "the fact finder would have had a
reasonable doubt respecting guilt. ' 141 As Justice Marshall pointed out
in his dissenting opinion in Strickland, this standard is unworkable
because evidence that may establish the defendant's innocence "may
be missing from the record precisely because of the incompetence of
defense counsel." 142 Documenting ineffective assistance therefore
often requires the development of additional evidence at a postconviction hearing. As a recent study of federal habeas petitions by
Professors Nancy J. King and Joseph L. Hoffman points out, however,
relief at this stage is largely hypothetical because in practice
[i]t is available only if the defendant (1) does not waive through his
136. See generally LAURENCE A.
FACE OF JUSTICE

BENNER

& ELIZABETH L. NEARY,

THE OTHER

(1973) (reporting on the National Defender Survey conducted by

the National Legal Aid and Defender Association).
137. See also ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANT,
available at http://www.abanet.or
BROKEN
PROMISE (2004),
GIDEON'S
g/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/.
138. The right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment means the right
to the effective assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
n. 14 (1970).
139. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
140. To establish a constitutional violation, a defendant must show 1) that
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and 2)
that there is a reasonable probability but for counsel's unprofessional error the
outcome would have been different. Strickland,466 U.S. at 687.
141. Id. at 695.
142. Id. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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plea the right to raise a Strickland claim in post-conviction review,
(2) is sentenced long enough to reach a post-conviction stage where
a record can be made, (3) can show that his lawyer's action was not
strategic, and hardest of all, (4) can show a reasonable
probability
143
of a different outcome had the error never happened.
King and Hoffman found that only seven out of nearly 2,400 federal
habeas petitioners obtained any form of relief. 144 As they observe,
however, because today there are so many obstacles to obtaining
federal habeas relief, it can be argued that these rare successes
' 145
represent not "a needle in a haystack" but the "tip of an iceberg."
Responses from certified criminal defense specialists validate this
observation. These criminal defense specialists were asked: "Have
you personally witnessed within the last 12 months an error or
deficient performance by a criminal defense lawyer in your county,
which you believe fell below the standard of reasonably competent
representation." More than three fourths (76%) answered that they had
observed such ineffective representation. Over half (55%) indicated
that they had seen deficient performances by both retained counsel
and indigent defense counsel. 146
Our examination of more than 2,500 California state and federal
appellate cases raising an ineffectiveness of counsel (IAC) claim
during the last ten years revealed a success rate somewhat higher than
that found by King and Hoffman. Nevertheless, successful claims
represented only a tiny fraction of the cases we examined. We
discovered only 121 cases in which counsel's performance was found
to be deficient. The majority of these cases (60%) were brought via
post-conviction petitions. 147 In only 104 cases was this deficient
143. Nancy J. King & Joseph L. Hoffman, Envisioning Post-Conviction
Review for the Twenty-First Century, 78 Miss. L.J. 433, 438-39 (2008).
144. Id. at 437.
145. Id. at 440.
146. n=107. Fifty-nine respondents witnessed errors by both private and
publicly provided counsel. Fourteen witnessed errors by only retained counsel and
eight witnessed errors by only indigent defense counsel. Twenty-six reported seeing
no ineffective representation. Three respondents did not answer this question.
147. The largest number of these deficient performance cases (43%) were
brought as federal habeas petitions, 17% were state habeas petitions, and 38% were
direct appeals. Two cases were appeals involving a motion for a new trial, and one
case was brought via a writ of mandate.
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performance also found to be prejudicial and thus justify reversal of
the defendant's conviction or sentence. Thus, the success rate was
only 4%. 148
A. Type of Errors
One of the most significant findings from our study was the
discovery that nearly half (44%) of the "deficient performance" cases
involved counsel's failure to conduct an adequate investigation. This
finding is especially disturbing because in the majority (74%) of these
cases, counsel's failure went directly to the heart of guilt or innocence.
In the remaining cases, counsel failed to uncover mitigating evidence
that would have affected the outcome of the defendant's sentence.
The Supreme Court in Rompilla v. Beard149 recently shed light on
the duty to investigate with respect to mitigating evidence. Rompilla
involved a death penalty case in which the Court found that defense
counsel was ineffective for failing to discover critical mitigation
evidence, some of which was contained in readily available court
50
records relating to a prior conviction.'
Rompilla was arrested in 1988 for the murder of a bar owner in
Allentown, Pennsylvania. The prosecution asked for the death penalty
and notified Rompilla's public defenders that they were going to use
the transcript of a prior conviction in aggravation. 151
The defense put on several family members in mitigation, but
failed to review school records, medical records, juvenile and adult
prison records, police records, or the complete transcript of his prior
conviction.' 52 Had they done so, the defense would have found
significant evidence of mental illness, mental retardation, and an
abusive childhood. Rompilla's parents were alcoholics. 53 He was
repeatedly beaten by his father, locked in a dog pen, forced to sleep in
a freezing attic, and kept isolated from others. 54 Tests indicated that

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

104 divided by 2,500 equals 4%.
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
Id. at 389.
Id. at 377-78.
Id. at 378, 382.
Id. at 391.

154. Id. at 392.
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Rompilla suffered from schizophrenia and had only a third-grade level
of cognition. 155 None of this was brought to the attention of the jury,
a death sentence, which the
however, and Rompilla was given 156
affirmed.
Court
Supreme
Pennsylvania
On habeas review, the Federal District Court granted relief,
ordering a new penalty phase on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel because counsel had failed to investigate "pretty obvious
signs" that Rompilla had a troubled childhood and suffered from
mental illness. 157 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion by
Judge Samuel Alito, as he then was, reversed the District Court.158
Under United States Code section 2254(d), habeas relief may not
be granted unless the state court's decision "was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law." 159 Rompilla argued that the failure of defense counsel to obtain
and examine records that they knew existed could not possibly be
considered a reasonable strategy or tactic, and thus, could not
reasonably be justified under the standard for determining ineffective
assistance of counsel set forth in Strickland.160 Furthermore, post
conviction counsel developed testimony that Rompilla suffered from
organic brain damage, probably caused by fetal alcohol syndrome,
which significantly impaired his cognitive functioning and
the
substantially impaired "Rompilla's capacity to appreciate
' 161
law."
the
to
conduct
his
conform
to
or
conduct
his
criminality of
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had found significant, however,
the fact that defense counsel had interviewed family members and
neither they nor the defendant himself had suggested that any abuse
occurred. 162 Defense counsel also had Rompilla examined by three
63
experienced psychiatrists who did not detect mental illness.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 391.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 379.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 380 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984)).

161. Id. at 392.
162. Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233, 241 (3d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 545 U.S. 374
(2005).
163. Id. at 242.
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Although these individuals later testified that had they known of the
1 64
defendant's background they would have conducted further tests,
the state court found defense counsel's reliance upon these
professionals to be reasonable. 165 Judge Alito, over a strong dissent,
held that the state court's conclusion "that trial counsel acted
reasonably and rendered effective assistance" was not an unreasonable
166
application of Strickland.
In reversing Judge Alito's decision, Justice Souter, writing for a
five-justice majority, joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg,
and O'Connor, found that obtaining the readily available records was
not only a matter of common sense, but an unmistakable "obligation"
established by the ABA Standardsfor Criminal Justice. In Wiggins v.
Smith, the Court observed that the ABA Standards are reliable norms
for determining what are reasonable standards for attorney
performance. 67 Standard 4-4.1, then in circulation at the time of
Rompilla's trial, provided:
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the
circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to facts
relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of
conviction. The investigation should always include efforts to
secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law
enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless of
the accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts
68
constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead guilty. 1
Finding the state court's decision objectively unreasonable,
Justice Souter stated that it "flouts prudence to deny that a defense
lawyer should try to look at a file he knows the prosecution will cull
164. Id.
165. Id. at 245. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that "counsel
reasonably relied upon their discussion with Appellant and upon their experts to
determine the records needed to evaluate his mental health and other potential
mitigating circumstances." Id.
166. Id. at 251.
167. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003).
168. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (citing 1 ABA, STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 4-4.1 (2d ed.
1982 Supp.)). The current provision (4-1.2) is substantially the same. ABA,
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 120-21.
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for aggravating evidence, let alone when the file is sitting in the trial
courthouse, open for the asking. No reasonable lawyer would forego
examination of [such a] file." 1 69 Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented.
While it seems clear in Wiggins and Rompilla that the Supreme
Court put new teeth in the Strickland standard for determining the
effectiveness of capital defense representation, one may question
whether this commitment will remain now that Justice Alito has
replaced Justice O'Connor on the Court.
Table 6

..

tPercent

of

Failure to Investigate

53

44%

Lack of Knowledge of Law

39

32%

Guilty Plea Advice
Failure to raise Mental Health Issue

14
13

12%
11%

Lack of Trial Skills
Sentencing Error

12

10%

10

8%

Failure to suppress Ina&nissible Evidence

8

7%

Failure to Call Expert

5

4%

Failure to challenge/present Forensic Evidence

3

2%

Failure to file Notice of Appeal

3

2%

Failure to Call Witness

3

2%

Failure to Object

3

2%

Negligence

3

2%

Conflict of Interest

2

2%

Other -

2

2%

Because many cases contain multiple claims the
number of claims exceeds the number of cases.

*

n= 121 cases

Table 6 identifies the other categories in which our research showed
courts had found deficient performance by defense counsel. Almost
one third (32%) involved counsel's lack of knowledge of the law.
These error of law cases involved deficient understanding of
169. Id. at 389.
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procedure, the criminal law, or the law of evidence. Evidentiary
errors, for example, included the failure to object to character
evidence, profile evidence, and other prejudicial and irrelevant
evidence. 170 The next most frequent types of deficiency concerned
inaccurate guilty plea advice, failure to raise mental health issues
relevant to a defense or mitigation of sentence, lack of trial skills
(such as failure to object to improper actions of the prosecutor), and
errors at sentencing such as the failure to correct sentencing
calculation errors.
Interestingly, a number of "mistakes" attributed to defense
counsel were first committed by the prosecutor and acquiesced in by
the trial judge. For example, in People v Holguin,17 1 defendant had
waived his right to jury trial on the allegation he had been convicted
of a burglary, which qualified as a strike under California's "Three
Strikes" law.172 On the day set for bench trial on the strike allegation,
the prosecutor filed an amended allegation stating a different charge
because the original burglary did not qualify as a strike. Defense
counsel objected on the ground of timeliness, but failed to precisely
state the proper ground. 173 Counsel may have been ineffective, but the
error was made in the first instance by the prosecutor, and this error
was furthermore sanctioned by the trial judge over defense counsel's
objection. In another case, defense counsel was found ineffective for
failing to object when the prosecutor took the stand and testified to
impeach her own witness. At trial the prosecution's witness gave
exculpatory testimony and recanted earlier statements that had
incriminated the defendant. The prosecutor then expressed her
personal belief in defendant's guilt during closing argument stating: "I
said it on the stand, but now I will say it to you as arguing this case, I
SYSTEMIC FACTORS II, supra note 4, at 12.
171. People v. Holguin, No. B153066, 2002 WL 31862857 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec.
23, 2002) (unpublished decision).
172. Under California's 'Three Strikes" law, a defendant's sentence can be
dramatically increased as a result of prior felony convictions which qualify as
"strikes." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West 2009).
173. Defendant was entitled to have the same jury that convicted him decide all
strike allegations. People v. Tindall, 14 P.3d 207 (Cal. 2000). Because counsel
proceeded with the bench trial after his timeliness objection was overruled, the
appellate court held that he waived the defendant's jury trial right, and then found
counsel ineffective for doing so.

170.
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believe, based on the evidence before you in this case, that this woman
placed that pillow over her baby's head [and] is guilty of felony child
174
endangerment."
Although the prosecutor engaged in blatant misconduct in both
continuing as an advocate after testifying and in expressing her
personal belief in defendant's guilt, the case was decided on the
75
ineffectiveness of counsel (IAC) claim.1
B. The Ineffective Attorneys

Attempting to identify the attorney who provided ineffective
assistance proved to be quite challenging as appellate courts routinely
fail to state either the name or the affiliation of the attorney. The veil
of secrecy that surrounds IAC cases reached unusual proportions in an
embarrassing case where a retained defense lawyer was found in his
car in the courthouse parking lot, passed out from methamphetamine
use. Arrested for drug possession, he spent the night in jail and then,
without preparation, gave an incoherent closing argument to the jury
the next day.176 This case came to our attention as a federal habeas
case, but we learned that the California Court of Appeal had failed to
even send the state appellate decision (which found no ineffective
assistance) to Westlaw.1 77 While this case was literally unpublished,
174. People v. Donaldson, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548, 555 (Ct. App. 2001).
175. Id. at 919. The Court acknowledged that State Bar Rules of Professional
Conduct, Rule 5-210, prohibit a lawyer from acting as both a witness and advocate
before a jury, subject to limited exceptions that were clearly not applicable. Id. at
927-31. The Court also acknowledged that the prosecutor's expression of personal
belief in defendant's guilt was also highly prejudicial. Id. at 931. It should also be
noted that the trial court did nothing to stop the prosecutor's misconduct although
California law expressly grants a trial court the "power . . . [t]o control in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers and all other persons in
any manner connected with a judicial proceeding .
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
128(a)(5) (West 2009).
176. Alvary v. Cambra, No. 06-15002, 2006 WL 3623707 (9th Cir. Dec. 12,
2006).
177. We discovered the state Court of Appeal decision because it was
mentioned in defendant's brief in his federal habeas appeal. Brief for Appellant at
*5, Alvary v. Cambra, 2006 WL 2364585 (9th Cir. Apr. 16, 2006) (No. USCA 0615002). The Ninth Circuit decision affirming the denial of defendant's habeas
petition was also unpublished. Deciding the appeal without oral argument, the Ninth
Circuit conceded that counsel's performance in this first degree murder case was
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we found that over half (54.5%) of the successful IAC cases we
discovered were not certified for publication. When such decisions are
decertified before being sent to Westlaw, no headnote or key number
is added by Westlaw to facilitate research on this issue. The recurrent
practice of not publishing ineffective assistance of counsel decisions
not only hampers research on this issue, it also hinders the
development of the law and dissemination of legal standards of
conduct for defense attorneys. Protecting the reputation of the bar
from being tarnished by such decisions would seem an insufficient
justification when what is needed is more transparency.
In those cases in which the status of the attorney could be
identified, thirty-nine (32%) were privately retained, eighteen (15%)
were assigned counsel, and forty (33%) were public defenders. In the
remaining twenty-four cases we were not able to determine the
identity of the attorney. Further research in this area would require
doing a docket study in each county in which the IAC case arose.
Nevertheless, based on the available data, it does appear that the
deficient performance rate by privately retained counsel is higher than
would be expected if one assumes, based upon the indigency rate for
California counties, that only about 15% of criminal defendants retain
178
private counsel.
As Table 7 shows, the overwhelming majority of the attorneys
who provided ineffective assistance were experienced attorneys.
Seventy-six percent had eleven or more years of experience. The
average number of years experience at the time of the deficient
performance was eighteen years. Only five attorneys (6%) had less
than five years experience. One third of the attorneys had over twenty
years experience. In those cases where counsel had over twenty years
experience, the most frequent error was lack of knowledge of law
(38%), followed by the failure to investigate (35%), and failure to
raise a mental health issue (17%).
The fact that almost one in five (19%) of these cases involved the
death penalty may account for the apparent overrepresentation of
179
older attorneys, since these cases were, with few exceptions,
deficient, but concluded without discussion that the petitioner had failed to prove
prejudice. The opinion contains only eleven sentences, totaling 284 words.
178. This is based upon our finding that the indigency rate is at least 85%. See
supra note 111.
179. One death penalty attorney had less than ten years experience. See supra
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represented by attorneys with substantial experience. In any event, it
cannot be said that most errors are due to inexperience.

5 years or less
6-10 years
1-20 years

5
16
37

6%
18%
43%

Over 20 years
n=87

29

33%

Table 7
IX. SOLUTIONS
As several commentators have concluded and our research
confirms, relying upon post-conviction remedies to correct
deficiencies in the provision of defense services has not worked. 180
What then can be done to remedy the systemic problems that threaten
our ability to provide effective assistance of counsel? In light of the
current economic downturn, it is obviously not an opportune time to
propose solutions that entail an additional expenditure of government
funds. Therefore, every effort must be made to search for pragmatic
alternatives without abandoning the principles that are the foundation
for our adversary system of criminal justice. We should never forget,
however, that the right to counsel is not an optional entitlement, but a
necessity that should have priority when compared to many other
competing claims for government funding.

note 76 and accompanying text discussing minimum qualifications for counsel in
capital cases. Three others had ten to eleven years experience. The majority,

however, had substantial experience, often over twenty years.
180. See King & Hoffman, supra note 143, at 442.
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A. Providingfor Adequate Defense Investigation
In light of the findings we have reported above, it is clear that
reforms need to be made to ensure that our criminal justice system
provides every person accused of serious crime with the opportunity
to have an adequate investigation conducted in their defense. The
problem any system for providing investigation confronts is that every
case does not need investigation. Defendants who are guilty are often
happy to accept a plea bargain. Yet we know from the Los Angeles
Rampart Scandal that the pressures created by the plea bargaining
system can induce innocent defendants to plead guilty to crimes they
1 About half of all the defense counsel responding to
did not commit. 18
our questionnaire (both indigent defense providers and certified
criminal defense specialists) reported that the stage at which a felony
case is most frequently resolved is at a disposition conference prior to
the time scheduled for the preliminary examination (also called the
preliminary hearing). Since preliminary hearings for defendants in
82
custody must be held within ten court days following arraignment,'
investigation must be promptly undertaken to properly evaluate the
merits of the case. If defense attorneys presume their client is guilty
based on little more than a police report, and do not conduct an
independent investigation (especially where the evidence against the
accused consists of eyewitness identification testimony), there is little
assurance that a Rampart type scandal could not happen again.
The first step would therefore be to ensure that, at a minimum,
every defendant charged with a felony is promptly provided with a
qualified investigator. In an ideal world, an inquiry by the court into
the adequacy of resources for conducting a proper defense
investigation should be made at the arraignment regardless of whether
the defendant has retained counsel or the public defender. Therefore,
unless private defense counsel represents to the court that his or her
client has sufficient funds to conduct an adequate investigation, or, if
181. See the Fair Commission, reporting the dismissal of over 100 convictions,
"many of them on pleas of guilty" which had been obtained as a result of "a pattern
of false arrests, perjured testimony and the planting of evidence by L.A.P.D. officers
assigned to the Crash Unit of the Department's Rampart Division." CAL. COMM'N
ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON COMPLIANCE
WITH THE PROSECUTORIAL DUTY TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 3 (2008).

182.

CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 859(b) (West 2009).
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counsel is appointed, that the defender office or assigned counsel
program has sufficient investigative resources to conduct the "in-depth
factual inquiry" mandated by California State Bar standards,1 83 the
court should ensure that a proper investigation will be conducted. This
could be done by authorizing the necessary funds to hire a qualified
investigator if the court determines that an investigation is reasonably
necessary considering the nature of the charges and the type of
evidence against the accused.
In such an ideal world no guilty plea would be taken without the
trial court satisfying itself that an adequate investigation has been
conducted. However, we do not live in an ideal world and given the
current economic climate, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect that
funding for investigators would routinely be made available at such an
early stage, even though that is when investigation is most needed and
most likely to be efficient and effective. We therefore turn to other
structural solutions.
1. Providing Prompt Discovery
It is elementary that in order for defense counsel to comply with
their duty to provide effective representation and in particular their
duty to investigate, 84 they must first have received and had an
adequate opportunity to examine the evidence against the accused.
California law already requires the prosecutor to disclose this
evidence to the defense in discovery.' 85 Yet 95% of the certified
criminal defense specialists and 93% of all indigent defense providers
(institutional and contract defenders combined) reported having a
problem getting prompt discovery from the prosecutor in their county.
As previously noted, the fate of the defendant in many felony cases is
determined at a disposition conference held prior to the preliminary
hearing. However, under California's statutory provisions regulating
criminal discovery, disclosure is not required until thirty days before
trial. 186 Therefore, as a practical matter, the existing time limitations
under California law render the prosecutor's disclosure obligations

183. CALIFORNIA STATE BAR STANDARDS, supra note 37, at 8-9.
184. See ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 38.
185.
186.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1 (West 2007).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.7 (West 2007).

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

illusory in those cases disposed of shortly after arraignment. One
solution for improving the ability of the defense to conduct a prompt
and adequate investigation would be to bring the discovery rules in
line with actual practice.
Because about half of all felony dispositions occur at a felony
disposition conference held shortly after arraignment, the prosecutor
should provide prompt discovery prior to that stage. This could be
accomplished by amending California Penal Code (PC) section 1054.7
to require the prosecution to promptly turn over all statutorily required
discovery1 87 requested by defendant within five working days after
arraignment, with a continuing duty to promptly disclose additional
information arising after that time. An alternative would be to require
the prosecutor to make such disclosures at the felony disposition
conference. This would allow the judge to monitor compliance. The
proceeding could then be continued to enable defense counsel to
conduct any investigation needed as a result of such disclosures.
Prosecutors should be barred from making a "take it or leave it offer"
until all discovery obligations have first been complied with and
defense counsel has had adequate opportunity to interview
eyewitnesses and other key witnesses essential to establishing any
controverted material fact necessary to establish an element of the
crime charged.
In view of the problems encountered in turning over Brady
evidence,1 8 8 it is also proposed that PC section 1054.1(e) be amended
to remove any ambiguity in defining this duty of disclosure by
expressly defining "exculpatory evidence" to include the following:
Exculpatory Evidence: Any fact, opinion, claim, statement or report
(whether verbal or written) and any tangible evidence, that tends to
187. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1 (West 2007).
188. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. The problem of prosecutors
withholding evidence from the defense that is favorable to the accused was recently
highlighted by U.S. Attorney General Erik Holder, who moved to void the

conviction obtained against former Alaska Senator Ted Stevens on corruption
charges after it was discovered that notes of a prosecution interview with a key
witness, which were inconsistent with the witness's testimony at trial, had not been
disclosed to the defense. See Erika Bolstad, Justice Department Moves to Void
Stevens' Conviction, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 1, 2009, http://www.miamiherald.com/
news/politics/AP/story/97872 1-p2.html.
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support any defense or position that is favorable to the accused with
regard to either guilt, an affirmative defense, or mitigation of
punishment, or, which would be inconsistent with any fact, opinion,
claim, statement, report or position that might reasonably be
expected to be asserted by the prosecution at trial.
This definition is consistent with the ABA Prosecution Function
Standards, which require disclosure of evidence under a relevance
standard-i.e., that it has a tendency to benefit the accused. 89 It is also
supported by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Bagley, which held that impeachment evidence is included within the
definition of exculpatory evidence favorable to the accused and must
be disclosed to the defense. 90
To ensure that these provisions are enforceable, it is suggested
that a defendant be given a statutory right to continue any readiness
conference, disposition conference, preliminary hearing, or other
hearing, if requested discovery has not been promptly provided prior
to that stage. Provision should also be made that any such continuance
shall not be construed as a waiver of time with respect to any statutory
or constitutional right to a speedy trial.
2. Reinstatement of the TraditionalPreliminaryExamination
Given limited investigative resources, public defender offices do
not routinely interview witnesses before the preliminary hearing,
which must be held within ten days after arraignment for a felony
defendant in custody. When defenders were asked how often
189. The ABA ProsecutionFunction Standardsprovides:
Standard 3-3.11 Disclosure of Evidence by the Prosecutor
(a) A prosecutor should not intentionally fail to make timely disclosure to
the defense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of the existence of all
evidence or information which tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigate the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the
punishment of the accused.
(b) A prosecutor should not fail to make a reasonably diligent effort to
comply with a legally proper discovery request.
(c) A prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence
because he or she believes it will damage the prosecution's case or aid the
accused.
ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 81.
190. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).

336

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

investigators interviewed victims and/or eyewitnesses before the
preliminary hearing, over one half (56%) stated this was done only
occasionally. Four offices responded that such interviews were rarely
done. Less than one third (31%) of the offices stated that key
witnesses were often (or very often) interviewed before the
1
preliminary hearing.' 91
Prior to Proposition 115,192 defense counsel had the opportunity to
cross examine such key witnesses at the preliminary hearing and were
thus able to make an informed assessment of the credibility of the
witness and intelligently evaluate the merits of the case. Proposition
115, however, took away the right to confront witnesses at the
preliminary hearing. The statements of witnesses, untested by crossexamination, can simply be presented by a police officer. 193 Thus, the
defense is deprived of any meaningful opportunity to test the merits of
the state's case at this stage.
The loss of the check and balance provided by the traditional
preliminary hearing is a serious problem where defense counsel lacks
the investigative resources necessary to conduct the "in depth factual
194
inquiry" required by national and California State Bar standards.
This problem is compounded further where the prosecution delays in
turning over discovery and withholds Brady evidence. Without
adequate resources, defender office investigators are forced to play
"catch up," interviewing witnesses shortly before trial when memories
may have faded, or worse, may have been contaminated by media and
other influences. By contrast, if the traditional preliminary hearing is
reinstated, this will give the defense an opportunity to meaningfully
191. Only three offices reported that such interviews were conducted "very
often."

192.

CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 872(b) (West 2009) (as amended by the Crime

Victims Justice Reform Act, Initiative Measure Prop. 115 (approved June 5, 1990)
and codified at CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 14.1, 24, 29, 30; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§
223, 223.5 (West Supp. 1998); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1203.1 (West 1995); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 189, 190.2, 190.41, 190.5, 206, 206.1, 859, 866, 871.6, 872, 954.1, 987.05,
1049.5, 1050.1, 1054, 1054.1, 1054.2, 1054.3, 1054.4, 1054.5, 1054.6, 1054.7,
1102.5, 1102.7, 1385.1,1430, 1511 (West Supp. 1998)). See generally Laura Berend,
Less Reliable Preliminary Hearings and Plea Bargains in Criminal Cases in
California: Discovery Before and After Proposition 115, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 465,
466 (1998).
193. CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(b) (West 2009).
194. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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test the merits of the prosecution's case before making a decision
regarding disposition. At the same time, it will cause the prosecution
to focus on its discovery obligations, which will have the additional
benefit of weeding out charges that cannot be sustained.
At a minimum, PC section 872 could be amended to require that
all eyewitnesses and any essential witness concerning a contested
issue material to probable cause be called to testify at the preliminary
hearing absent good cause. This recommendation is not new. It
essentially tracks the same recommendation made by the Los Angeles
County Bar Association Task Force on the State Criminal Justice
System in April 2003, following the Rampart Scandal. 195 In gutting
the preliminary hearing to promote efficiency and convenience over
justice, Proposition 115 departed from a long historical tradition that
ensured an accused would have the opportunity to test the accuracy of
the prosecution's case at an early stage. As the L.A. Task Force
observed:
The preliminary hearing should be more than a procedural nicety in
which a court determines whether the face of a police report
supplies probable cause to proceed to trial. All parties should use it
as a reliable and efficient way to evaluate196the testimony and
evidence, as well as to judge the case's merits.
It was hoped that prosecutors would take the lessons learned from
the Rampart Scandal to heart and exercise their discretion to test the
credibility and accuracy of key witnesses at the preliminary hearing,
but this has not happened uniformly throughout the state. Over one
half of the indigent defense providers (57%) and certified specialists
(62%) reported that key witnesses such as victims and eyewitnesses
were rarely or only occasionally called at the preliminary hearing. The
preliminary hearing has thus remained an empty ritual.

195. L.A. COUNTY BAR ASS'N TASK FORCE ON THE STATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Sys., A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF LESSONS LEARNED: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
IMPROVING THE CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE WAKE OF THE
SCANDAL (2003). The 24 member Task Force included former
prosecutors, criminal defense practitioners, judges, academicians, and community
RAMPART

leaders, and was chaired by U.S. District Court Judge Audrey Collins. Id. Appendix
C.
196. Id. at 8.
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As Figure 9 reveals, 95% of the certified criminal defense
specialists agreed that giving defendants the right to cross examine
key witnesses at the preliminary hearing would improve the
effectiveness of defense representation; 83.5% strongly agreed with
this proposition. Only by bringing back the preliminary hearing, as it
existed prior to Proposition 115, will we be able to guarantee that all
participants-the defense counsel, the district attorney, and the
court-will take an active role in examining the case against the
accused at an early stage.
Should the Traditional Preliminary Hearing be Reinstated?

Figure 9
It is recognized that any change in the current law would require a
super-majority of the state legislature' 97 However, returning to the
time-honored traditional means of ensuring innocent defendants are
not convicted should at least be considered in cases involving
eyewitness identification testimony. In view of the documented

197. Proposition 115 limited the normal legislative process by requiring that its
provisions could not be amended except by a two-thirds majority vote in both
houses or by a statute approved by the voters. See § 872(b).
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dangers of mistaken eyewitness identification, 19 8 it is difficult to
understand how rational opposition could be made to the following
limited amendment:
Where probable cause is based in whole or in part upon statements
relating to eyewitness identification,'99 the defendant shall have the
right to cross examine any percipient eyewitness at the preliminary
examination, provided that where an eyewitness is a victim of the
defendant's alleged crime, the court may, upon a showing of good
cause, order that the victim's deposition be taken in lieu of public
testimony, at which deposition the defendant shall be represented
by counsel.

3. Depositions
Because both private and publicly provided defense counsel have
reported difficulty in interviewing prosecution witnesses, the wider
use of depositions should also be considered. This would give defense
counsel an effective option where witnesses have been encouraged not
to talk to defense counsel,20 0 or where the prosecution has failed to
call key witnesses at the preliminary hearing. Such notable jurists as
Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan have advocated the use of
depositions in criminal cases. 20 1 Taking depositions of witnesses in

198. Innocence projects have shown us that mistaken eyewitness identification
is a leading cause of unjust convictions of the innocent. See Arye Tattner, Convicted
But Innocent, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283 (1988) (reporting that in a study of 205
wrongful convictions, 52.3% had been the result of mistaken eyewitness
identification testimony).
199. Statements relating to identification would include not only statements
identifying the person of the defendant, but also any statement making an
identification which incriminated the defendant, such as identification of the car he
was allegedly driving.
200. Neither the police nor the prosecutor are permitted to instruct a witness
not to talk to the defense. Walker v. Superior Court, 317 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1957). However, the practice of discouraging witnesses from speaking with
defense attorneys reportedly persists. See Comments of certified criminal defense
specialists infra p. 352.
201. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The CriminalProsecution:Sporting Event or
Quest For Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L. Q. 279 (1963).
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felony cases has also been authorized by State Supreme Court20 Rule
in
2
Vermont.
and
Missouri,
Florida,
including
states,
a number of
If the broad use of depositions is not considered feasible, at a
minimum defense counsel should be given the option to take the
deposition of a witness in the limited circumstance where the
witness's name and address have not been promptly disclosed to the
defense as required by PC section 1054. This remedy is in theory
already available under the broad discretion given to the trial court by
PC section 1054.5.203 However, in view of the widespread complaints
we received that prosecutors were not providing prompt discovery and
that judges were not disciplining prosecutors for such discovery
violations, including Brady violations, making this limited remedy
explicit would provide a needed incentive to ensure prosecutors
comply with their discovery obligations. This could be done either by
Supreme Court Rule or by amending PC section 1335, which already
permits taking depositions of witnesses under certain limited
circumstances. 20 4 This remedy should also be available when a
witness refuses to talk to the defense, especially where it appears that
the witness has been encouraged not to talk to anyone prior to trial. As
the Supreme Court of California stated in People v. Hannon: "[E]qual
access to potential witnesses is a goal to be encouraged. Attempts by
one side of a controversy to limit such accessibility by the other side is
' 20 5
not conduct which brings about respect for our system of justice.
4. Providingfor Pre-ArraignmentRepresentation
We documented that most indigent defense providers are not
appointed until arraignment. More than one in four does not contact a
felony defendant in custody until three or more days after arrest. In
some instances, the first contact is more than five days after arrest.
This systemic problem interferes with the duty to conduct a prompt
202. See FLA. R. CRIM. PROc. 3.220 (h)(2001); MO. SUP. CT. R. 25.12-18
(2004); VT. R. CRIM. PROC. 15(e)(4) (2000).
203. PC section 1054.5 provides that upon a showing of non-compliance with
discovery obligations a court "may make any order necessary to enforce the
provisions of this chapter .. " CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.5 (West 2009).
2414. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1335 (West 2009).
205. People v. Hannon, 564 P.2d 1203, 1211 n.5 (Cal. 1977); see also Walker,
317 P.2d at 134.
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investigation. In addition, we found confusion regarding the duty of
indigent defense providers to provide advice to an indigent arrestee
upon request. Some primary providers also apparently believe that
they cannot provide any representation until appointed. An easy
solution to this problem is to amend Government Code section 27706
to remove any ambiguity about the public defender's duty to provide
advice prior to appointment by the court, and thereby clarify the right
of the public defender to have immediate access to an accused who
remains in custody without counsel.
In view of the fact that virtually all of the institutional public
defenders already labor under excessive attorney and investigator
caseloads, it will be necessary to give the primary indigent defense
provider in each county the resources necessary to screen in-custody
felony arrestees on a daily basis and interview any arrestee, who in
their opinion may be indigent, to determine the need for advice,
representation, and immediate investigation. Law schools are one
source that can be enlisted to provide assistance in this endeavor. The
San Diego Bail Project, created as a joint venture between the San
Diego Public Defender Office and California Western School of Law
(CWSL), has successfully provided the indigent accused in San Diego
with immediate access to legal services since 2000.206 Designed to
implement national standards that provide that defense services should
be available to an indigent accused as soon as they are arrested,20 7
second and third-year law students are given specialized training in
client interviewing, ethics, and bail representation. After obtaining
security clearances and certification from the State Bar, the students
then act as pre-arraignment representatives of the Public Defender's
Office. Going into the jail in three-hour shifts, the students interview
recent arrestees who have not made bail and advise them of their
rights. Students verify information essential for bail representation
(such as the defendant's current employment, length of residence, and
206. See CWSL course description for Advanced Criminal Justice Seminar
with integrated Bail Project clinical component, available at http://www.cwsl.edu
/main/default.asp?nav=faculty.asp&header=faculty.gif&body=benner/courses taugh

t.asp#bail (last visited Mar. 20, 2009). Due to the popularity of the Bail Project, the
two other local law schools (the University of San Diego Law School and Thomas
Jefferson School of Law) now also participate in the program.
207. See ABA, STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 38,
at 77; NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 44, at 501 (Recommendation 1.2).
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ties to the local community) and deal with concerns arising from their
incarceration. By establishing early contact with clients, students are
in a position to initiate an immediate investigation if needed.2 °8
Students also represent clients at arraignment and in appropriate cases
seek a reduction in bail or release on the client's own recognizance.
Honored with the "Program of the Year" award by the California
Public Defenders' Association, the Bail Project benefits both
defendants and the corrections system. 20 9 Not only do defendants
benefit from the law student's efforts on their behalf, but the judicial
system also benefits because bail decisions are made on the basis of
reliable information. There are also cost savings to the county as
clients who would otherwise have remained in jail do not have to be
warehoused, do not lose their jobs, and do not see their families go on
welfare.2 1 °
208. For example, there have been incidents where a defense investigator was
called to the jail to document and photograph cuts and bruises on the defendant.
209. The Sheriff of San Diego County, William Kolender, "enthusiastically"
endorsed the Bail Project noting that it has helped "the county make better use of
limited incarceration facilities by providing judges with the information they need to
make appropriate decisions regarding pre-trial release of suitable inmates." Letter
from William B. Kolender, Sheriff, San Diego County Sheriff's Dep't (Feb. 22,
2007) (on file with author).
210. During a single trimester in which detailed statistics were kept (Spring
trimester 2007), CWSL students obtained a reduction in bail or release on the
defendant's own recognizance in 227 cases. Of this total, 196 (86%) actually
obtained release. This resulted in significant alleviation of jail overcrowding as the
196 inmates would have spent a combined total of 7,644 days in jail awaiting
disposition. (This figure is based upon data collected by the Bail Project pursuant to
a federal grant sponsored by former Congressman Duncan Hunter.) Inmates
interviewed during the term who did not bail out remained in jail pending
disposition an average of 39 days; thus 39 days x 196 inmates released = 7,644
days). According to the San Diego County Sheriff Department's 2004 Year in
Review, it cost $94.29 per day for the county to incarcerate an inmate in 2004, with
meals costing $2.25 per meal. SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEP'T, 2004 YEAR IN
REVIEW (2004), available at http://sandiegohealth.org/crime/sheriff/2004_report.
pdf. According to the same report for 2007 this cost increased by 16.6% in just three
years to $110 per day per inmate despite reducing the cost of meals in 2007 to $.95
per meal. See SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEP'T, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 12
(2007), available at http://www.sdsheriff.net/documents/2007_report.pdf. The
potential for substantial cost savings from pre-arraignment representation would
therefore appear to justify serious consideration be given to adding a paralegal to the
staff of a public defender office to undertake this function in areas that cannot be
serviced by law schools. Extrapolating the results of this single term suggests that
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B. Providing Adequate Fundingfor Indigent Defense Services
The obligation to provide effective assistance of counsel and the
resources necessary to conduct an adequate defense are state
obligations. More than a mere entitlement, such obligations are
constitutionally mandated as bedrock fundamental rights of the
indigent accused. Yet we have seen substantial disparities among
counties in the resources allocated for indigent defense. The type of
representation an indigent accused receives should not depend upon
the county in which he or she is arrested. It can therefore be argued
that the failure of a state to ensure that resources necessary to an
adequate defense are provided in each county across the state violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 11
As recognized by the ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense
Delivery System, 212 our criminal justice system should also ensure that
there is substantial parity between the resources allocated to indigent
defense providers and the district attorney's office in terms of

over $100,000 could be saved annually in just meal costs alone. Because Bail
Project students must first be trained and obtain security clearances and bar
certification, law students only interview and represent inmates for about ten weeks
during the fourteen-week term. Thus it is estimated that if one paralegal performed
the same tasks for fifty weeks, five times as many days would be saved by a full
time paralegal (7,644 x 5 = 38,220). Thus, $.95 per meal x three meals per day =
$2.85 per day per inmate x 38,220 days saved = $108,927.00 savings in meal costs.
211. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000). The Equal Protection argument can be sketched briefly as follows: Bush v.
Gore held that where the enjoyment of a fundamental right is endangered by the
failure to employ uniform standards, a state is required to take reasonable steps to
ensure equal treatment in the enjoyment of that right. The right to the effective
assistance of counsel is of course a fundamental right. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344 (1963). As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Rompilla v. Beard,
545 U.S. 374 (2005), national standards provide a benchmark for assessing
uniformly the effectiveness of representation. Thus, unequal treatment in providing
indigent defense services could be shown where there are significant disparities in
the resources allocated to indigent defense systems in different counties and these
disparities result in measurable differences in compliance with national and state bar
standards. Significant disparity in the adequacy of resources would thus arguably
give rise to an Equal Protection claim in counties where, for example, a defense
investigator is not provided or where attorney caseloads are so grossly excessive that
an attorney cannot give adequate attention to a case. See supra Part IV.A.
212. ABA, TEN PRINCPLES, supra note 9, at 3.
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workload, salaries, technology, legal research, support
investigators, and access to forensic services and experts.

staff,

Figure 10
Ideally, the most efficient and cost effective way to eliminate the
disparity between counties and the disparity in resources between
prosecution and defense is to create a state funded, statewide public
defender system organized as a state agency. Half of the states have
already done this.21 3 Given California's current budget crisis, this may
not seem to be a realistic option at this time, but to rely upon county
governments, which depend upon property taxes for revenue, would
seem to be an even greater folly in times of economic hardship.

213. Thirty states have now taken over the responsibility for funding indigent
defense services at the trial level. They are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado,

Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. NAT'L
LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, A RACE TO THE BOTTOM, SPEED AND SAVINGS
OVER DUE PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 5 n.8 (2008), http://www.mynlada.o
rg/michigan/michigan-report.pdf.
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1. Commissionfor Indigent Defense Services

To help solve the threat to effective representation created by the
disparities documented by our research, it is therefore suggested as an
interim measure that an independent, state funded, Commission for
Indigent Defense Services be established to assist counties in bringing
their system for delivering indigent defense services into compliance
with national and State Bar standards.2 14 The Commission's first task
would be to conduct an audit of the indigent defense delivery systems
in each county, concentrating initially on the counties we have
identified as being at risk.2 15 This audit would primarily focus on the
need for additional attorneys, investigators, and other support
personnel. Using time studies and other analytical tools, the
Commission would determine and justify appropriate workload levels
for attorneys and investigators, taking into account the unique
circumstances of each county, including its geographic and
demographic characteristics and its prosecutorial and judicial
practices. Because of the wide disparity in the financial ability of
counties to fund indigent defense services, it is anticipated that state
assistance would be needed to establish appropriate staffing levels
determined by the Commission's audit. The Commission would then
certify that a county is in compliance when appropriate staffing levels
are met.
The Commission would also assist in providing training for new
attorneys, investigators, and support personnel, and in rural areas
would create regional backup service centers that would provide
qualified investigators and sentencing mitigation specialists in death
penalty and other appropriate cases.

214. Only the bare outlines can be sketched here, but critical to the success of
this proposal is an effective guarantee of the independence of the Commission. This
could be achieved by legislation which sets forth qualifications for members of the
Commission and provides that the Governor, Chief Justice of the California
Supreme Court, President of the State Bar of California, and President of the
California Public Defender's Association each select one member of the
Commission. These four members would then select the fifth member. The
Commission would hire an Executive Director and staff to carry out the work of the
Commission and issue annual reports on the status of indigent defense services in
California.
215. See Table 5 supra p. 318.

346

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

Finally and equally important, legislation should provide that the
Commission receive from each county basic statistical data sufficient
to permit it to monitor the health of the indigent defense delivery
system. In the event excessive caseloads reappear and are not
corrected within a reasonable period, the Commission should have the
power to revoke the county's certification. The negative publicity
from de-certification and the impact this would have on ineffective
assistance of counsel claims arising from that county, as well as
providing a basis for a lawsuit to order compliance, would provide
strong incentives for voluntary compliance with the maximum
workload levels established by the Commission. Under this proposed
hybrid system of county and state funding, the county would thus
maintain its existing level of commitment and the state would
continue to fund in the future the amount needed for additional staff.
This would ensure that as the cost of indigent defense services rises as
a result of increasing caseloads, this additional cost would be borne by
the state.
2. Sources of Fundingfor Indigent Defense Improvements
Obtaining additional funding for indigent defense is difficult in
the best of times and would seem even more problematic given
today's economic realities. Yet a significant portion of the funds
needed to improve California's indigent defense system could be
found by simply rethinking how we spend our criminal justice dollars
and redirecting the cost savings from some of California's current
poor choices. There are a number of areas where cost savings could be
achieved. These include: (1) abolishing the death penalty, (2)
abolishing mandatory minimum sentences, and (3) decriminalizing
some non-violent misdemeanor offenses by making them infractions.
In addition, fines currently given exclusively to law enforcement
should be shared so that an appropriate portion is given to the defense
component of the criminal justice system. Finally, the bail system
of the amount of
could be reformed so that defendants would pay 10%
21 6
bondsman.
bail
private
a
than
rather
state
the
to
bail

216. Illinois, for example, operates such a system. See 38 ILL. COMP. STAT.
110-7 (2009).
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It is clear that much of the funding needed to improve indigent
defense systems in California could be found by simply eliminating
the death penalty. The Fair Commission estimated that it costs $137.7
million annually to maintain the present death penalty system in
California. 217 By contrast, only $11.5 million would be required to
handle these same cases if a sentence of life without parole was
imposed.2 18 Thus $126.2 million in current expenditures could be
21 9
transferred to improving indigent defense in California.
3. Regulating Contractsfor Indigent Defense Services
The temptation for counties to use contract systems to save money
(by awarding contracts solely on the basis of the lowest bid) presents a
serious danger to the integrity of our criminal justice system. 220 What
should be bid on is the amount of profit the contractor will receive, not
the amount of quality that will be provided. It is therefore suggested
that flat fee bids (per case or for an indeterminate or fixed caseload)
be prohibited. Instead, contracts for indigent defense services should
be required to specify the number and cost of attorneys, staff
investigators, and other support services that will be utilized to handle
a specific number of cases. Thus, all bids would be on a "cost-plus"
basis for a specific pre-determined number of cases.
The Commission could also be given responsibility to oversee and
approve contracts for indigent defense services based on specific
criteria linked to national and State Bar standards. 22 1 These criteria

217. CAL. COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 156
(2008).
218. Id.
219. $137.7 - $11.5 = $126.2. A number of studies in other states have also

found similar cost savings. Death Penalty Information Center, Costs of the Death
Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs-death-penalty (last visited Mar. 3,

2009).
220. Guidelines for contracting for indigent defense services promulgated by
the National Legal Aid and Defender Association provide: "Under no circumstances
should a contract be awarded on the basis of cost alone." See NAT'L LEGAL AID &
DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING GOVERNMENTAL
CONTRACTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES,

Guideline IV-3 (1984), available at

http://www.nlada.org/Defender/DefenderStandards/Negotiating-And-Awarding-I
D_Contracts#threethree.
221. An alternative would be to amend state contracting laws to require that
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would include (1) establishing minimum levels of experience for
attorneys assigned to a death penalty or serious felony cases, (2)
compliance with maximum workload levels established for the county
by the Commission for Indigent Defense Services, and (3)
implementation of a supervisory structure and case management
information system for ensuring adequate supervision of staff
attorneys and monitoring of the contractor's overall performance.
These minimum safeguards are essential to ensure contractors are not
tempted to cut corners on the quality of representation provided.
4. Adequate Compensationfor Assigned Counsel
Inadequate compensation for assigned counsel panel attorneys is
not only unjust but promotes ineffective assistance of counsel by
providing economic incentives that work against the provision of
adequate representation. PC section 987.2(a) could be amended to
provide that the fee structure for assigned counsel be determined by a
three member panel of experts appointed by the local judiciary, the
county board of supervisors, and the local bar association. This would
help ensure fair compensation with input from all important
participants.
C. Providingfor an Independent Forensics
Laboratoryfor the Defense
In an adversary system that increasingly relies upon scientific
evidence, it is imperative that an objectively neutral laboratory be
available for the defense. The number of national scandals revealing
corrupted laboratory technicians in state-run crime labs underscores
this point. 222 Eighty-eight percent (88%) of the certified criminal
defense specialists and 73% of the indigent defense providers
expressing an opinion favored the establishment of an independent
forensics laboratory. It is therefore suggested that a state funded
forensics laboratory be established to provide expert criminalists and
conduct forensic testing. These support services should be available
not only to indigent defense providers, but also to retained counsel,
with provision for reimbursement based on the ability to pay.
indigent defense contractors meet the established criteria discussed above.
222. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
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It should be noted that when we asked private and public defense
counsel to express their opinion about whether they favored such a
laboratory, the question stipulated that the laboratory would be
available to both prosecution and defense, but would be operated as an
independent agency. A number of defense counsel expressed
skepticism regarding whether true independence could be achieved if
police and prosecutors would be clients of the laboratory. Therefore, it
is recommended that the laboratory serve the defense function
exclusively.
The laboratory should be operated by a non-governmental agency,
possibly attached to a university, and should be governed by an
independent board of trustees who would hire the director, set
standards for staff, and monitor the operation of the laboratory. One
source of funding that could be considered is California Health and
Safety Code section 11372.5(b), which controls the disposition of
fines collected from drug offenders and specifically provides that
those funds be used for a criminalistics laboratory. 223 As seen in Santa
Clara County, these funds were being used exclusively for a
prosecution crime lab. However, as former Attorney General Janet
Reno observed: "We have to ensure that we provide the same level of
support and oversight for indigent defense services that we provide for
other agencies and functions, or our criminal justice system will not be
2 24
a system and it won't work.
D. Judicial Training
It is respectfully suggested that state court judges presiding over
criminal trials should receive training about the types of situations that
have led to the conviction of the innocent. While the great majority
(74%) of judges responding to our questionnaire reported that recent
training had been offered to judges and/or attorneys in their county on
the topic of search and seizure, only one third reported such training
was offered on proper eyewitness identification procedures. Yet, as
previously noted, mistaken eyewitness identification is a leading cause
of the conviction of the innocent. Further, only about one half of the
responding judges reported that training was offered regarding
223.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11372.5(b)

(West 2009).

224. Attorney General Janet Reno, Remarks at the National Symposium on
Indigent Defense (2000), in INDIGENT DEFENSE, Oct.-Nov. 2000 vol. 4 n.2.
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forensic evidence collection and testing techniques, or on the impact
brain disorders, mental illness, and retardation have on competency
and culpability. The lessons learned from the work of innocence
projects across the country and a review of ineffective assistance of
counsel cases should be made available to judges so that they will
have a greater appreciation of defense counsel's need for investigative
assistance including forensic and other expert assistance.
X. LISTENING TO THEIR VOICES

Indigent defense providers and certified criminal defense
specialists were asked to describe any practice or policy of judges or
prosecutors which they believed hindered effective defense
representation in their county. They were also given the opportunity to
comment on any area of concern not addressed in the questionnaire
sent to them. While space limitations do not permit the reporting of all
comments made 225 it would seem appropriate to conclude this article
by listening to some of the voices of those who are in the courtroom
every day, dealing with the reality of scarce resources and a system of
criminal justice that has forgotten it was designed to protect the
innocent and instead has become a system for processing the
226
presumed guilty.
Comments by Metropolitan Public Defenders:
* Late discovery without any court sanctions; late lab
work (drug results); our D.A. files all strikes
without using discretion...
" Lack of prompt discovery from D.A., withholding
of Brady evidence by D.A., inability to interview
prosecution witnesses.
• Constant hassle re: expert appointments.
" Judges participate in strong arm tactics to assist
D.A. in pushing hard bargains ....

225. See SYSTEMIC FACTORS H1,supra note 4, Appendix I.

226. Reponses are reported by type of county: Metropolitan (population over
one million), Urban (100,000 to one million) and Rural (under 100,000).
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Comments by Urban Public Defenders:
* System is completely broken in my view, and
there's no such thing as the evidence code or
constitutional
protections anymore....
AND
neither courts nor D.A.'s take any action against
cops who blatantly lie on stand-so they get away
with anything and everything w/ impunity. D.A.'s
filing policies-everything is a felony. . .. Petty
theft is a burglary or robbery; .01 gram of meth is a
felony even if Prop. 36 eligible.. .. In my view,
whole criminal justice system is broken-we're
creating an entire class of people who will never be
able to reap the benefits of society, and who have
no upward mobility whatsoever, creating worsening
social problems. We put them in a hole so deep
(fines, assessment, fees, terms of probation-for
those "lucky" enough to get probation) they can
never get out. And we force them to wear a scarlet
letter forever. The whole thing is a complex,
convoluted mess.
0 I have been a public defender for over thirty years
in three different counties. There is a great disparity
in the quality of defender services throughout the
state, I think that statewide minimum standardswith teeth-should be established and every county
should be required to meet those standards. A move
in
that
direction
exists
in
dependency
representation. Why not for criminal defense? An
alternative would be for the state to take over
administration and funding for criminal defense
services.
* Judges favor prosecutors-even suggesting how to
prosecute a case, giving continuances, putting
pressure on defense attorneys but not on
prosecutors. Defense attorneys are criticized for
lack of ability to force defendants to plead while
D.A.s who cannot make offers or settle cases
without their supervisor's approval are given every
courtesy. There is a general disdain by the judges
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towards criminal defendants and their counsel,
which is reflected in their choice of words,
demeanor, body language, and rulings.
Comments by Rural Public Defenders:
* The amount of assigned cases is not the problem.
The problem is the workload. Investigators are only
provided for very serious cases, so the individual
attorney is forced to do all investigation and
witness interviews.
* Judge pushes cases through system at rapid speed.
Comments by Certified Criminal Defense Specialists (from both urban
and metropolitan counties):
* 1) Discovery is always late. . . . The discovery
scheme is a hindrance to effective investigations by
the defense. This must be improved. 2) If the D.A.
chooses to proceed by preliminary hearing the
eyewitnesses must be presented.
* Restore a meaningful preliminary hearing. The
present system is of no value.
* Need to disclose all discovery and seek out Brady
evidence more vigorously and at an earlier point
than just before trial.
* Put ethics teeth into Brady obligations. D.A.'s
rarely are disciplined by State Bar or D.A .... even
in the most egregious cases of withholding
evidence.
* Set up an independent body to authorize funds for
resources for indigent defendants. .. . The
fees/rates that investigators are authorized make it
very difficult to get competent investigation done in
my court appointed cases.
* Stop the prosecution from using victim witness
advocates and/or its own lawyers to discourage
victims and witnesses from speaking with defense
investigators-witnesses should be made available
for brief, videotaped interviews with defense
investigators. The current practice of telling
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witnesses they do not have to talk with defense is
used to discourage and thwart defense
investigation.
I began when victims/witnesses were called at P.H.
[preliminary hearing]. We should return to that
system. It taught lawyers how to question witnesses
and helped to weed out weak cases.
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Appendix I
Type of Indigent Defense Provider by County

% of pop.
Class that
responded

Population
Class

County

Response
received
from
county'

Type of
Primary
Defense
Provider

100%

Los Angeles

Yes

Institutional

100%

Orange

Yes

Institutional

San Diego

Yes

Institutional

Alameda
Contra Costa
Riverside
Sacramento
San Bernardino
Santa Clara

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Institutional
Institutional
Institutional
Institutional
Institutional
Institutional

Fresno
Kern
San Francisco
San Joaquin

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

San Mateo
Stansilaus
Ventura

Yes
Yes
Yes

Institutional
Institutional
Institutional
Institutional
Assigned
Counsel
Institutional
Institutional

Marin
Monterey
Placer
San Luis
Obispo
Santa Barbara
Santa Cruz
Solano
Sonoma
Tulare

Yes
Yes
Yes

Institutional
Institutional
Contract

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Contract
Institutional
Contract
Institutional
Institutional
Institutional

Butte

No

Contract

100%

. 1I 1186%

100%

82%
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El Dorado
Humboldt
Imperial
Kings
Madera
Merced
Napa
Nevada

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Institutional
Institutional
Institutional
Contract
Contract
Institutional
Institutional
Institutional

Shasta
Y1

Yes
Yes

Institutional
Institutional

43%

Lake
Mendocino
San Benito
Sutter
Tehama
Tuolumne
Yuba

No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No

Contract
Institutional
Contract
Contract
Contract
Contract
Contract

60%

Amador
Calaveras

No
No

Contract
Contract

Colusa
Del Norte
Glenn
Inyo
Lassen
Mariposa
Plumas
Siskiyou

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Contract
Contract
Contract
Contract
Institutional
Contract
Contract
Institutional

Alpine
Modoc
Mono
Sierra
Trinity

No
Yes
Yes
No
No

Contract
Contract
Contract
Contract
Contract

40%

'Based on responses received from indigent defense providers, certified criminal
defense specialists, judges, and/or court personnel in each county.
"Institutional" = Institutional Public Defender, "Contract" = Contract Defender
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